End the Popularity Contest: A Proposal for Second Amendment \u27Type of Weapon\u27 Analysis by Jacobs, Cody
Boston University School of Law 
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law 
Faculty Scholarship 
Fall 2015 
End the Popularity Contest: A Proposal for Second Amendment 
'Type of Weapon' Analysis 
Cody Jacobs 
Boston University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Second Amendment Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Cody Jacobs, End the Popularity Contest: A Proposal for Second Amendment 'Type of Weapon' Analysis, 
83 Tennessee Law Review 231 (2015). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/651 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access 
by Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of 
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty 
Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarly 
Commons at Boston University School of Law. For more 
information, please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.  
 
END THE POPULARITY CONTEST: A PROPOSAL 
FOR SECOND AMENDMENT “TYPE OF WEAPON” 
ANALYSIS 
Cody J. Jacobs* 
The Supreme Court’s recognition in District of Columbia v. Heller 
of an individual Second Amendment right to bear arms for self-
defense raised many questions about the scope of that right. One issue 
that will become increasingly important in the years ahead, but that 
has received relatively little attention from scholars and courts, is the 
question of which “arms” are protected by that right. Heller purports 
to establish a test that asks whether the weapon at issue is in 
“common use” at the time the case is decided. This Article critiques 
that test, arguing that it creates poor incentives, is difficult to apply, 
and, most importantly, is disconnected from the central component of 
the Second Amendment right—self-defense. This Article proposes an 
alternative test that asks whether the weapon at issue is a reasonable 
choice for armed self-defense.         
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INTRODUCTION  
Since the Supreme Court held in District of Columbia v. Heller1 
that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to own a 
gun, separate and apart from service in a militia,2 scholars and 
lower courts have labored to define the scope of that right and the 
proper method of analysis for determining when the right is violated. 
Much of the major litigation and scholarship about the Second 
Amendment since Heller has focused on whether, and to what 
degree, the right recognized in Heller in the context of home self-
defense extends outside of the home.3 Courts and scholars have also 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 2. See id. at 599. The full text of the Second Amendment provides: “A well 
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the 
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 3. See, e.g., Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2014), 
vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 781 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2015); Drake v. Filko, 724 
F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, No. 13-827, 2014 WL 126071 (U.S. May 5, 
2014); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
422 (2013); Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012), reh’g en banc denied, 708 
F.3d 901 (7th Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013); Saul Cornell, The Right to Carry Firearms 
Outside of the Home: Separating Historical Myths from Historical Realities, 39 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1695 (2012); Michael P. O’Shea, Modeling the Second 
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examined whether Second Amendment claims should be analyzed 
using the traditional “level-of-scrutiny” analysis used in other areas 
of constitutional law or if the Second Amendment calls for a different 
“historical” or “categorical” approach.4 This Article focuses on a 
different question: How should courts determine which weapons the 
Second Amendment guarantees individuals the right to use for self-
defense? This question is likely to become increasingly important to 
courts as weaponry becomes more sophisticated and both assault 
weapons and bans on assault weapons become more popular.   
This Article examines the “common use” test established in 
Heller and the attempted application of that test by lower courts. 
That test asks whether the weapon at issue is in common use at the 
time the case is decided.5 This test is not easy to apply or desirable 
in the modern era of weaponry, nor does precedent or the Second 
                                                                                                                 
 
Amendment Right to Carry Arms (I): Judicial Tradition and the Scope of “Bearing 
Arms” for Self-Defense, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 585 (2012); Jordan E. Pratt, A First 
Amendment-Inspired Approach to Heller’s “Schools” and “Government Buildings,” 92 
NEB. L. REV. 537 (2014); see also Jonathan Meltzer, Note, Open Carry for All: Heller 
and Our Nineteenth-Century Second Amendment, 123 YALE L.J. 1486, 1488 (2014) 
(“The most consequential cases in defining the contours of the Second Amendment, 
however, relate to the right to carry firearms outside the home.”). 
 4. See, e.g., Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1167–68 (noting that the courts of appeals 
“have grappled with varying sliding-scale and tiered-scrutiny approaches, agreeing 
as a general matter that ‘the level of scrutiny applied to gun control regulations 
depends on the regulation’s burden on the Second Amendment right to keep and bear 
arms,’” but also noting that “an alternative approach for the most severe cases . . . 
[where] . . . [a] law effect[s] a ‘destruction of the right’ rather than merely burdening 
it”); Heller v. D.C., 670 F.3d 1244, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) 
(“In my view, Heller and McDonald leave little doubt that courts are to assess gun 
bans and regulations based on text, history, and tradition, not by a balancing test 
such as strict or intermediate scrutiny.”); Ivan E. Bodensteiner, Scope of the Second 
Amendment Right—Post-Heller Standard of Review, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 43 (2009); 
Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcolm, McDonald v. Chicago: Which Standard of 
Scrutiny Should Apply to Gun Control Laws?, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 437 (2011); Stacey 
L. Sobel, The Tsunami of Legal Uncertainty: What’s A Court to Do Post-McDonald?, 
21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 489 (2012); Michael J. Habib, The Second Amendment 
Standard of Review: The Quintessential Clean-Slate for Sliding-Scale Scrutiny, 
ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Summer 2012, at 13; Ryan L. Card, Note, An Opinion 
Without Standards: The Supreme Court’s Refusal to Adopt A Standard of 
Constitutional Review in District of Columbia v. Heller Will Likely Cause Headaches 
for Future Judicial Review of Gun-Control Regulations, 23 BYU J. PUB. L. 259 
(2009); Andrew Peace, Comment, A Snowball’s Chance in Heller: Why Decastro’s 
Substantial Burden Standard is Unlikely to Survive, 54 B.C.L. REV. ELECTRONIC 
SUPPLEMENT 175 (2013), available at http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol54/ 
iss6/14. 
 5. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 624–25. 
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Amendment’s text require it. Indeed, lower courts have already been 
shirking the common use test rather than following it to its logical—
and disturbing—conclusions that lead to both over-protecting and 
under-protecting Second Amendment rights.6 This Article proposes 
an alternative test that calls for courts to objectively examine 
whether the weapon at issue is a reasonable weapon for self-defense. 
This inquiry looks at the weapon’s usefulness in a self-defense 
situation, its potential dangerousness to innocent bystanders, and 
the likelihood that the weapon will be employed for illegal purposes. 
Although this test is not perfect, it would protect the core right of 
armed self-defense recognized in Heller7 while allowing regulation of 
the most dangerous weapons. 
This Article begins in Part II with an overview of the growing 
popularity of assault weapons and large capacity magazines and 
government efforts to ban these weapons. Part III summarizes the 
Heller decision and the common use test it describes for determining 
which arms the Second Amendment protects. Part III also describes 
the analytical framework courts have settled on for analyzing 
Second Amendment claims since Heller was decided. Part IV 
describes how courts have struggled to apply the common use test 
and how these struggles illustrate fundamental problems with that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 6. See infra Part V. 
 7. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 599 (recognizing self-defense as “the central 
component of the right” to keep and bear arms in the Second Amendment). Of course, 
the validity of the central holding of Heller—that the Second Amendment protects an 
individual right separate from service in a militia—has been and continues to be the 
subject of rigorous scholarly debate. See, e.g., Saul Cornell, Originalism on Trial: The 
Use and Abuse of History in District of Columbia v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 625, 630 
(2008) (“Scalia’s use of historical texts is entirely arbitrary and result oriented. 
Atypical texts that support Scalia . . . are pronounced to be influential, while 
generally influential texts . . . are dismissed as unrepresentative. Such an approach 
is intellectually dishonest and suggests that Justice Scalia’s brand of plain-meaning 
originalism is little more than a smoke screen for his own political agenda.”) (citation 
omitted); David B. Kopel, The Natural Right of Self-Defense: Heller’s Lesson for the 
World, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 235 (2008) (praising Heller’s recognition of the Second 
Amendment as codifying a pre-existing right and critiquing the dissenting opinions); 
see also McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 914 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(collecting articles critiquing Heller); William G. Merkel, The District of Columbia v. 
Heller and Antonin Scalia’s Perverse Sense of Originalism, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 349, 349 (2009) (“The majority holding—that the Second Amendment was 
originally understood to protect the right to possess any commonly held weapon for 
purposes unrelated to militia service such as self-defense and hunting—requires 
misreading, misunderstanding, or ignoring the bulk of relevant evidence . . . .”). 
Although this debate is surely an important one, this Article assumes the validity 
and ongoing vitality of Heller’s individual right holding.  
2015] SECOND AMENDMENT “TYPE OF WEAPON” ANALYSIS 5 
 
test. Part V examines five of the most fundamental problems with 
the common use test, discusses alternatives to the common use test 
proposed in scholarship, and proposes an alternative test based on 
reasonable self-defense. 
I.  TYPES OF WEAPONS – A BREWING CONTROVERSY 
Over the last few decades, the weaponry available to civilians 
has become more sophisticated and deadly. Recently—particularly 
since the 2012 shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School—activists 
and legislators have been increasingly calling for—and in some cases 
enacting—new restrictions on large capacity ammunition 
magazines8 and assault weapons. 9 These trends set the stage for 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. See Large Capacity Ammunition Magazines Policy Summary, LAW CTR. TO 
PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE (May 31, 2013), http://smartgunlaws.org/large-capacity-
ammunition-magazines-policy-summary/ (defining “large capacity” magazines as 
magazines with a capacity of more than ten rounds of ammunition). Ammunition 
magazines are containers that hold ammunition cartridges and feed them into a 
firearm. See OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, THE OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY AND 
THESAURUS 900 (2003). The “capacity” of a magazine refers to the number of 
cartridges a magazine can hold at one time. Large capacity ammunition magazines 
are generally considered by most laws to be those larger than ten rounds, but some 
laws set a higher number. See LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, supra.  
 9. See Brad Plumer, Everything You Need to Know About the Assault Weapons 
Ban, in One Post, WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
wonkblog/wp/2012/12/17/everything-you-need-to-know-about-banning-assault-
weapons-in-one-post/. Some gun rights enthusiasts take issue with the phrases 
“assault weapons” and “large capacity ammunition magazines” calling them 
“pejorative.” See, e.g., Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary 
Judgment at 7, Shew v. Malloy, 994 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Conn. Jan. 30, 2014) (No. 
3:13-cv-00739), 2013 WL 4511019 (“The Act bans standard magazines in common use 
that it calls ‘large capacity magazines . . . .’”.); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at n.3, 
Silveira v. Lokyer, 540 U.S. 1046 (2003) (No. 03-51), 2003 WL 23194550 (“The Court 
should be aware that the pejorative expression ‘assault weapon’ is used by anti-
firearm activists to frighten and mislead, not to inform.”). The issue about the 
definition of “assault weapons” stems from the way certain assault rifles modeled on 
military rifles have been marketed to civilians. This issue is discussed further below 
in Part II.A and in note 19, infra. For clarity, this Article will use the phrase “assault 
weapons” to refer to guns that were deemed assault weapons under the now-defunct 
federal assault weapons ban or are generally considered assault weapons by bans 
that currently exist in some states.  
  The “large capacity ammunition magazine” issue is more a dispute over 
semantics. Gun rights supporters dislike the phrase “large capacity” because it 
implies that these magazines are somehow out of the ordinary and therefore not 
protected by the Second Amendment under the “common use” test. As discussed 
below in Part V, this kind of dispute highlights the flawed nature of the inquiry that 
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legal clashes that will force courts to carefully examine the issue of 
what types of weapons are protected by the Second Amendment. 
A.  The Proliferation of Assault Weapons 
Although fully automatic and semi-automatic10 firearms became 
popular in the American military as early as World War I,11 the most 
common weapons on the civilian market in the twentieth century up 
until the 1980s bore little resemblance to those used on the 
battlefield. For example, although semi-automatic handguns were 
used by the military as early as 1911,12 revolvers dominated the 
American handgun market as recently as 1989.13   
The 1980s marked a shift in the gun industry toward the 
manufacture and marketing of civilian versions of military firearms. 
For example, the nine millimeter (“9mm”) semi-automatic pistol was 
widely marketed to the domestic population at the same time it was 
                                                                                                                 
 
the test requires. We would be better off disputing whether a given magazine size is 
actually reasonable for self-defense than whether it is subjectively “large.”  
 10. Automatic weapons continuously fire bullets while the trigger is depressed 
(until the available rounds are expended), while semi-automatic weapons fire only 
one bullet each time the trigger is depressed. See Jim Supica, A Brief History of 
Firearms, NAT. RIFLE ASS’N, http://www.nramuseum.org/gun-info-research/a-brief-
history-of-firearms.aspx (last visited Dec. 23, 2015). Single-shot guns (guns that are 
neither automatic nor semi-automatic) require some action by the user in order to 
load a new bullet into the chamber each time the gun is fired. See Adam Weinstein, 
A Non-Gun-Owner’s Guide to Guns, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 21, 2012, 7:01 AM) 
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/12/semi-automatic-gun-assault-weapon-
definitions. For example, a traditional single-action revolver requires the user to 
“cock” or pull back the hammer on the back of the gun, which rotates the cylinder so 
as to line up a new cartridge between the hammer and the barrel, and then to 
release the hammer by pulling a trigger. See Tom Harris, How Revolvers Work, HOW 
STUFF WORKS (Mar. 7, 2002), http://science.howstuffworks.com/revolver.htm.  
 11. See, e.g., STEPHEN BULL, WORLD WAR I TRENCH WARFARE (1) 1914–16, at 
11–12 (2002); Scott Engen, The History of the 1911 Pistol, BROWNING (Jan. 24, 2011), 
http://www.browning.com/library/infonews/detail.asp?ID=301. Notably, the first well-
functioning “machine gun” was invented much earlier, during the Civil War in 1862 
by Richard Gatling. See JULIA KELLER, MR. GATLING’S TERRIBLE MARVEL 1, 5 
(2008). 
 12. See, e.g., M-1911 Pistol History, M-1911 PISTOLS ORG., 
http://www.m1911.org/full_history.htm (last visited Dec. 23, 2015). 
 13. See VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., THE MILITARIZATION OF THE U.S. CIVILIAN 
FIREARMS MARKET 14 (2011), http://www.vpc.org/studies/militarization.pdf 
[hereinafter VIOLENCE POLICY CTR.]; see also M.D. Johnson, The Trend Toward 
Autoloaders, in THE GUN DIGEST BOOK OF GUNS FOR PERSONAL SELF DEFENSE 36 
(Kevin Michalowski ed., 2004) (noting the trend in the 1980s of police departments 
and civilians switching from revolvers to semi-automatic handguns).  
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becoming the standard military side-arm.14 Eventually, the 9mm 
and similar semi-automatic pistols displaced the revolver as the 
most popular type of handgun on the civilian market.15 
The gun industry employed a similar strategy in the market for 
long guns. Beginning in the 1980s, the industry began to promote 
semi-automatic versions of assault rifles previously only marketed to 
the military.16 For example, the M-16, an assault rifle used by the 
military, was marketed to civilians as the AR-15.17 The main 
difference between the military versions of these firearms and their 
civilian counterparts was the ability to fire in fully automatic 
mode.18 While the M-16 and similar military assault rifles usually 
have a small lever that allows the user to switch between semi-
automatic and fully automatic mode, their civilian counterparts do 
not and are restricted to firing only in semi-automatic mode.19 
The significance of this difference is hotly debated20 but both 
sides agree that—other than the ability to fire in fully automatic 
                                                                                                                 
 
 14. VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., supra note 13, at 14–16. 
 15. See id. 
 16. See TOM DIAZ, THE LAST GUN 159–60 (2013). The heavy promotion of these 
rifles and other military firearms was likely motivated, at least in part, by declining 
handgun sales. See id. at 160. 
 17. See id. at 159–60; VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., supra note 13, at 25, 29. 
Originally the AR-15 was sold under a patent held by Colt Industries. DIAZ, supra 
note 16, at 159–60. Once that patent expired, numerous other manufacturers began 
selling similar guns, including the M&P15, which was used by James Holmes in the 
2012 Aurora, Colorado movie theatre shooting. Id. at 144–45, 160.  
 18. See id. at 157–58. 
 19. Id. at 157. 
 20. This is the primary dispute over the use of the phrase “assault weapons.” 
Pro-gun activists argue that “assault weapons” is a purely political term and that the 
phrase “assault rifles” should only be understood to refer to long guns capable of 
firing in fully automatic mode. See, e.g., Bruce H. Kobayashi & Joseph E. Olson, In 
Re 101 California Street: A Legal and Economic Analysis of Strict Liability for the 
Manufacture and Sale of “Assault Weapons,” 8 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 41, 42–43 
(1997) (“Prior to 1989, the term ‘assault weapon’ did not exist in the lexicon of 
firearms. It is a political term, developed by anti-gun publicists to expand the 
category of ‘assault rifles’ so as to allow an attack on as many additional firearms as 
possible on the basis of undefined ‘evil’ appearance.”); David B. Kopel, Rational Basis 
Analysis of “Assault Weapon” Prohibition, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 381, 387 (1994) (“No 
‘assault rifle’ (by Defense Intelligence Agency definition) is an ‘assault weapon’ 
because all ‘assault rifles’ are automatic, while no ‘assault weapons’ are automatic. 
‘Assault rifles’ are used by the military, whereas no ‘assault weapon’ is used by the 
military. ‘Assault rifles’ are all rifles, but ‘assault weapons’ include semiautomatic 
rifles, semiautomatic shotguns, revolver-action shotguns, semiautomatic handguns, 
and semiautomatic airguns.”). 
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mode—these civilian guns have all the same features of their 
military counterparts.21 Both sides also seem to agree that these 
guns have become more popular in recent years.22 
This rise in popularity—coupled with the use of assault weapons 
in many high profile mass shootings—has put these guns in the 
crosshairs of legislators, setting up a clash in the courts to settle 
whether (and/or to what extent) assault weapons are protected by 
the Second Amendment.            
B.  The Renewed Popularity Of Assault Weapon Bans 
Assault weapon bans in the United States have generally worked 
in one of three ways: they ban a list of predetermined gun models, 
ban guns with a certain number of specified features, or ban guns 
based on some combination of both.23 Laws using a “feature based” 
test typically look to whether the gun has features that are common 
in civilian models of military weapons, such as a telescopic or 
“folding” stock, a pistol grip protruding unusually far beneath the 
action of the weapon, or a barrel capable of accepting a flash 
suppressor.24 Such bans prohibit many of the military-style rifles, 
discussed above, that became popular beginning in the 1980s.      
                                                                                                                 
 
 21. See DIAZ, supra note 16, at 156 (noting that other than the ability to fire in 
fully automatic mode, civilian assault rifles “function identically” to their military 
counterparts); Liz Klimas, So What Is an ‘Assault Rifle’ Really? We Look at the 
Definitions and How the Term Is ‘Demonized,’ THE BLAZE (Jan. 11, 2013, 10:22 AM), 
http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/01/11/so-what-is-an-assault-rifle-really-we-
look-at-the-definitions-and-how-the-term-is-demonized/ (“[T]he only difference 
[between military and civilian assault rifles] is that one is fully automatic and the 
other is semi-automatic.”). 
 22. See VIOLENCE POLICY CTR., supra note 13, at 29, 40; see also Brief for 
Appellants at 46, Heller v. D.C., 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (No. 10-7036) (citing 
evidence from the district court record indicating that “[s]ome two million AR-15 type 
rifles are in civilian hands”); Justin Peters, How Many Assault Weapons Are There in 
America? How Much Would It Cost the Government To Buy Them Back?, SLATE (Dec. 
20, 2012), http://www.slate.com/blogs/crime/2012/12/20/assault_rifle_stats_how_ 
many_assault_rifles_are_there_in_america.html (estimating that there may be as 
many as 3.75 million AR-15s in the United States). 
 23. See, e.g., Brian Roth, Comment, Reconsidering a Federal Assault Weapons 
Ban in the Wake of the Aurora, Oak Creek, and Portland Shootings: Is It 
Constitutional in the Post-Heller Era?, 37 NOVA L. REV. 405, 413–14 (2013). 
 24. See, e.g., id.; see also Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and 
Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 
UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1484 (2009) (noting that assault weapons bans “often focus on 
features . . . such as folding stocks, pistol grips, bayonet mounts, flash suppressors, 
or (for assault handguns but not assault rifles) magazines that attach outside the 
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The first modern assault weapon ban in the United States was 
passed in California in 1989 in response to a series of high-profile 
shootings there in which gunmen used assault weapons.25 Other 
states followed suit, and by 1994, five states and several local 
governments had passed some form of assault weapon ban.26 Then, 
in 1994, Congress enacted a federal ban on assault weapons and 
large capacity ammunition magazines.27 The ban had a “sunset” 
provision under which it would expire in ten years if not renewed by 
Congress.28 During the time the ban was in effect, two additional 
states passed some version of their own assault weapon ban.29 The 
federal assault weapon ban expired in 2004, ten years after its 
effective date pursuant to its sunset provision.30 During the years 
between the federal assault weapon ban’s expiration in 2004 and 
2012, no other states adopted new assault weapon prohibitions.  
At the end of 2012, the country’s focus turned back to assault 
weapons and large capacity ammunition magazines after the Sandy 
                                                                                                                 
 
pistol grip or barrel shrouds that can be used as hand-holds.”).  
 25. See Daniel Abrams, Ending the Other Arms Race: An Argument for a Ban 
on Assault Weapons, 10 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 488, 489 (1992); Carl Ingram, Assault 
Gun Ban Wins Final Vote: Deukmejian’s Promised Approval Would Make It 1st Such 
U.S. Law, L.A. TIMES, May 19, 1989, at 1, 27, available at http://articles.latimes.com/ 
1989-05-19/news/mn-112_1_assault-weapons-ban-military-style-assault-types-of-
semiautomatic-rifles (“While the [California assault weapons ban] legislation was 
announced in December, it was the Jan. 17 murders of five Southeast Asian refugee 
children in a Stockton schoolyard that provided the emotional ingredient required to 
advance the bill and gain the support of [California Governor George] Deukmejian, 
long an opponent of new controls on guns.”). West Virginia had a law prior to 
California’s that regulated assault weapons, but that law was “of limited utility since 
it did not even define the term ‘assault weapon.’” Robert A. O’Hare, Jr. & Jorge 
Pedreira, An Uncertain Right: The Second Amendment and the Assault Weapon 
Legislation Controversy, 66 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 179, 196 (1992). 
 26. LEGAL CMTY. AGAINST VIOLENCE, BANNING ASSAULT WEAPONS—A LEGAL 
PRIMER FOR STATE AND LOCAL ACTION 3 (2004), http://smartgunlaws.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/05/Banning_Assault_Weapons_A_Legal_Primer_8.05_entire.pd
f [hereinafter LEGAL CMTY. AGAINST VIOLENCE]; see also Abrams, supra note 25, at 
489 (noting that as of 1992 “[o]ver thirty major cities” had enacted assault weapons 
laws). 
 27. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
322, §§ 110101, 110103 Stat. 1796 (1994). 
 28. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 § 110105(2). 
 29. See LEGAL CMTY. AGAINST VIOLENCE, supra note 26, at 3.  
 30. See, e.g., Jill Lawrence, Federal Ban on Assault Weapons Expires, USA 
TODAY (Sept. 14, 2004, 12:03 AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/ 
2004-09-12-weapons-ban_x.htm.  
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Hook Elementary School shooting in Newtown, Connecticut.31 The 
Sandy Hook gunman killed twenty elementary school students, 
seven adults, and himself primarily using a .223 Bushmaster rifle,32 
which is a variation on the AR-15.33 The gunman also used large 
capacity ammunition magazines.34 The Newtown tragedy led to a 
nationwide push for stronger gun control laws, including bans on 
assault weapons and large capacity ammunition magazines.35  
Although higher profile efforts at the federal level have failed to 
revive the defunct national assault weapon ban,36 several states 
passed laws either strengthening existing bans on assault weapons 
and large capacity ammunition magazines or enacting new ones.37 
One thing the debates at both the state and federal levels on these 
issues had in common (whether those debates ended in new laws or 
not) was that opponents and supporters of these proposals hotly 
debated their constitutionality. For example, one legislator in 
California called a proposed bill that would have expanded 
California’s existing assault weapons ban an attempt to “erase the 
Second Amendment.”38 Proponents of the bill to renew the federal 
                                                                                                                 
 
 31. See N.Y. TIMES, State Gun Laws Enacted in the Year After Newtown, Dec. 
10, 2013, at A20, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/12/10/us/state-gun-laws-
enacted-in-the-year-since-newtown.html. 
 32. James Barron, Pupils Were All Shot Multiple Times with a Semiautomatic, 
Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2012, at 1, 27, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/ 
16/nyregion/gunman-kills-20-children-at-school-in-connecticut-28-dead-in-
all.html?_r=0. The gunman killed his own mother at home prior to going to the 
school and killing twenty children and six school employees. Id. at 27. 
 33. See Lee Ferran & Shushannah Walshe, Newtown Massacre: What Is a 
Bushmaster .223?, ABC NEWS (Dec. 17, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/newtow
n-massacre-bushmaster-223/story?id=18000884.  
 34. See Matt Ferner, Adam Lanza, Sandy Hook Shooter, Used High-Capacity 
Magazines From Colorado’s Magpul Industries, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 26, 2013, 
2:46 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/26/adam-lanza-sandy-hook-maga 
zines-magpul_n_4344175.html.  
 35. See, e.g., Josh Blackman & Shelby Baird, The Shooting Cycle, 46 CONN. L. 
REV. 1513 (2014) (noting the sharp increase in support for a federal assault weapons 
ban and other gun laws following the Newtown shooting). 
 36. Ed O’Keefe, Gun Background Check Compromise, Assault Weapon Ban Fail 
in Senate, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-
politics/wp/2013/04/17/senate-to-vote-on-amendments-to-gun-bill-with-background-
check-plan-in-doubt/. 
 37. See N.Y. TIMES, supra note 31, at A20.  
 38. Awr Hawkins, CA Republican: ‘Assault Weapons’ Ban ‘Erases’ Second 
Amendment, BREITBART (Oct. 7, 2013), http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Government/ 
2013/10/07/Pending-CA-Assault-Weapons-Ban-Erases-The-Second-Amendment. 
Indeed, the bill that the legislator was referring to, SB 374, was ultimately vetoed by 
the governor because the governor did not believe that the “bill’s blanket ban on 
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assault weapons ban argued that it was consistent with the Second 
Amendment, with one senator noting that “[t]here are reasonable 
limits on each [constitutional] amendment” and another arguing 
that “[i]t is hard to imagine that it would [not] be a violation of the 
First Amendment for somebody to yell fire in a crowded theater but 
[that it would be] a violation of the Second Amendment to prevent 
somebody from bringing a hundred-round magazine into a crowded 
theater . . . .”39 Even the bill’s stated purpose included an implicit 
argument for its constitutionality under Heller, stating that the bill 
was intended “[t]o regulate assault weapons, to ensure that the right 
to keep and bear arms is not unlimited, and for other purposes.”40    
The series of new laws that did pass at the state and local level 
set the stage for court battles over the scope of the Second 
Amendment’s protection for different types of guns and magazines 
between those governments and proponents of expanded gun rights. 
II.  POST-HELLER SECOND AMENDMENT DOCTRINE—HELLER, THE 
COMMON USE TEST, AND THE TWO-STEP TEST 
The decision in Heller was groundbreaking in that it recognized, 
for the first time, that the Second Amendment protects an individual 
right to bear arms for self-defense unconnected to militia service. 
However, the opinion was somewhat vague on what the proper the 
method of analysis was for Second Amendment claims. Lower courts 
have filled in some of the gap, with most settling on a version of a 
two-part analysis: (1) asking whether the conduct at issue is 
protected by the Second Amendment and, if it is, (2) selecting and 
applying an appropriate level of scrutiny.41 
                                                                                                                 
 
semi-automatic rifles would reduce criminal activity or enhance public safety enough 
to warrant this infringement on gun owners’ rights.” See Veto Message from Jerry 
Brown, Governor, to the Members of the Cal. State Senate (Oct. 11, 2013), available 
at http://gov.ca.gov/docs/SB_374_2013_Veto_Message.pdf. 
 39. Nicole Flatow, Senators Destroy Ted Cruz’s Argument Against the Assault 
Weapons Ban, THINK PROGRESS (Mar. 14, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/ 
justice/2013/03/14/1720351/senators-destroy-ted-cruzs-argument-against-the-assault-
weapons-ban/. 
 40. S. 150, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013) (emphasis added); cf. D.C. v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (“Like most rights, the right secured by the Second 
Amendment is not unlimited.”). 
 41. See infra Part V. 
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A.  District of Columbia v. Heller 
1.  Embracing an Individual Right 
In Heller, the plaintiff challenged a set of laws in the District of 
Columbia that effectively banned handguns in the home.42 The 
Supreme Court held, in a five to four decision, that these laws 
violated the Second Amendment. The Heller decision marked a 
watershed moment in courts’ understanding of the Second 
Amendment. Prior to that decision, courts had generally agreed that 
the Second Amendment only protected a “collective right” to own 
firearms for the purpose of service in a well-regulated militia.43  
Heller emphatically rejected this “collective right” view, instead 
finding that the Second Amendment protected an individual right to 
use firearms for self-defense.44 Although the Court acknowledged 
that the framers’ purpose in including the Second Amendment in the 
Bill of Rights may have been tied to militia service, the Court found 
that the framers’ method of accomplishing that purpose was to codify 
a pre-existing right to keep and bear arms.45 The Court announced 
that the pre-existing right’s “central component” was the right to use 
arms for self-defense.46 
The Court reached this conclusion first by parsing the text of the 
Second Amendment and then through a long historical analysis that 
examined the public understanding of the “right to bear arms” prior 
to, contemporaneous with, and in the decades following the Second 
Amendment’s adoption.47 The analysis relied heavily on 
contemporary commentators, news accounts, and case law 
interpreting analogous state constitutional provisions.48   
                                                                                                                 
 
 42. Heller, 554 U.S. at 574–76. The plaintiff also challenged a law requiring 
guns kept in the home to be completely disassembled and unloaded when not in use. 
Id. 
 43. See, e.g., Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle over 
the Second Amendment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 708 (2012) (“For most of the 
twentieth century, the meaning of the Second Amendment seemed well settled. 
Courts consistently read it as guaranteeing a right to have and use guns only for 
purposes of organized state militia activity.”); see also Reva B. Siegel, Heller & 
Originalism’s Dead Hand—In Theory and Practice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1399, 1412–13 
(2009) (noting that Heller represented the first time in history the Supreme Court 
had struck down a law as violation of the Second Amendment). 
 44. Heller, 554 U.S. at 599. 
 45. See id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 576–619. 
 48. Id. at 602–19. 
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Once the Court found that such a right existed, it had no trouble 
finding that the District of Columbia’s handgun ban violated that 
right.49 However, in contrast to the lengthy discussion of whether 
the right at issue was an individual one or a “collective” one (which 
was also the primary subject of Justice Stevens’ dissent), the Court 
said relatively little about the method of analysis that was to be 
applied in future Second Amendment claims. It did not, for example, 
lay out a particular level of scrutiny to be applied in Second 
Amendment cases. Although the majority rejected the interest-
balancing test resembling intermediate scrutiny proposed by Justice 
Breyer’s dissent, it did not lay out its own test but instead simply 
noted that the District’s scheme would fail “[u]nder any of the 
standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated 
constitutional rights.”50 The Court did acknowledge that the Second 
Amendment right it recognized was “not unlimited” and laid out a 
few categories of regulation that were “longstanding” and therefore 
“presumptively lawful” under the Second Amendment, such as laws 
prohibiting felons from owning firearms.51 However, even that list 
came with the caveat that it was “not exhaustive.”52 The Court did 
not explain its methodology for creating the list.53  
2.  The “Common Use” Test 
The Heller Court also spilled little ink on the question of what 
types of “arms” the Second Amendment protects. In discussing the 
text of the Second Amendment, the Court endorsed the seemingly 
broad view that the term “arms” encompassed any “weapo[n] of 
offence, or armour of defence” whether or not such an arm was the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 49. Id. at 628–29. 
 050. Id. at 628. The Court also struck down the District of Columbia’s 
requirement that guns be kept completely disassembled and unloaded when not in 
use, finding that the requirement made “it impossible for citizens to use [firearms] 
for the core lawful purpose of self-defense and [was therefore] unconstitutional.” Id. 
at 630. 
 51. Id. at 626–27. The Court also said that prohibitions on firearm ownership 
by the mentally ill, laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such 
as schools and government buildings, and laws imposing conditions and 
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms were presumptively constitutional. Id.  
 52. Id. at 627 n.26. 
 53. See id. at 721 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I am similarly puzzled by the 
majority’s list, in Part III of its opinion, of provisions that in its view would survive 
Second Amendment scrutiny. . . . Why these? Is it that similar restrictions existed in 
the late 18th century? The majority fails to cite any colonial analogues.”). 
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type used in war.54 The Court also sharply dismissed the idea that 
the Second Amendment only protects the particular arms in 
existence at the time of the Amendment’s adoption, finding that the 
“Second Amendment extends, prima facie, to all instruments that 
constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at 
the time of the founding.”55   
After this brief discussion about the meaning of the term “arms,” 
the types of arms covered by the Second Amendment did not come 
up in the Court’s extensive historical analysis, and the issue was 
only raised again in a section of the Court’s opinion discussing 
whether the individual rights interpretation of the Second 
Amendment conflicted with any of the Court’s prior holdings.56 In 
that section, the Court attempted to distinguish its individual right 
holding from its 1939 holding in United States v. Miller,57 that a law 
prohibiting the transportation of an unregistered short-barreled 
shotgun in interstate commerce did not violate the Second 
Amendment.58 
In Miller, the Court found that “[i]n the absence of any evidence 
tending to show that the possession or use of a [short-barreled 
shotgun] at this time has some reasonable relationship to the 
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say 
that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear 
such an instrument.”59 The Heller majority was mainly concerned 
with refuting Justice Stevens’ argument in dissent that Miller 
supported a collective right interpretation of the Second 
Amendment, and only briefly touched on the “type of weapon” test 
Miller appears to suggest: 
Read in isolation, Miller’s phrase “part of ordinary military 
equipment” could mean that only those weapons useful in 
warfare are protected. That would be a startling reading of 
the opinion, since it would mean that . . . restrictions on 
machineguns . . . might be unconstitutional, machineguns 
being useful in warfare in 1939. We think that Miller’s 
“ordinary military equipment” language must be read in 
tandem with what comes after: “[O]rdinarily when called for 
[militia] service [able-bodied] men were expected to appear 
bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in 
common use at the time.” The traditional militia was formed 
                                                                                                                 
 
 54. Id. at 581. 
 55. Id. at 582. 
 56. Id. at 624–25. 
 57. 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
 58. Id. at 178. 
 59. Id.  
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from a pool of men bringing arms “in common use at the 
time” for lawful purposes like self-defense. “In the colonial 
and revolutionary war era, [small-arms] weapons used by 
militiamen and weapons used in defense of person and home 
were one and the same.” Indeed, that is precisely the way in 
which the Second Amendment’s operative clause furthers the 
purpose announced in its preface. We therefore read Miller to 
say only that the Second Amendment does not protect those 
weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for 
lawful purposes, such as short-barreled shotguns.60 
Thus, in distancing itself from the “startling reading” of Miller 
that Miller’s military usefulness test would seem to suggest, the 
Court formulated a “common use” test focusing on whether the 
weapons at issue are currently in common use for lawful purposes 
such as self-defense.61 Compared with the rest of the opinion, the 
Court’s selection of this test was based on relatively little historical 
analysis. The Court simply noted that people in the militia at the 
time of the founding commonly used the personal weapons they 
brought with them to service.62 
The Court briefly alluded to the common use test again in the 
context of applying the newly recognized individual Second 
Amendment right to the District of Columbia’s handgun ban, finding 
that “[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied 
to enumerated constitutional rights, banning from the home ‘the 
most preferred firearm in the nation to “keep” and use for protection 
of one’s home and family,’ would fail constitutional muster.”63 The 
Court rejected the District of Columbia’s argument that because long 
guns were still legal, it could ban handguns: 
It is enough to note, as we have observed, that the American 
people have considered the handgun to be the quintessential 
self-defense weapon. There are many reasons that a citizen 
may prefer a handgun for home defense: It is easier to store 
in a location that is readily accessible in an emergency; it 
                                                                                                                 
 
 60. Heller, 554 U.S. at 624–25 (citations omitted). 
 61. Id. at 624. 
 62. Id. at 624–25. Even that assertion is somewhat debatable. Justice Breyer 
pointed out in dissent that some militias at the time of the founding required specific 
types of guns, not just whatever weapons the citizens called to serve in the militia 
happened to have around. Id. at 716 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that some militia 
statutes at the time found handguns “‘acceptable’ only for certain special militiamen 
(generally, certain soldiers on horseback), while requiring muskets or rifles for the 
general infantry.”).  
 63. Id. at 628–29 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
16 TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83:XXX 
 
cannot easily be redirected or wrestled away by an attacker; 
it is easier to use for those without the upper-body strength 
to lift and aim a long gun; it can be pointed at a burglar with 
one hand while the other hand dials the police. Whatever the 
reason, handguns are the most popular weapon chosen by 
Americans for self-defense in the home, and a complete 
prohibition of their use is invalid.64 
Again, the Court simply reiterated (adding the somewhat cryptic 
introduction of “it is enough to note”) that handguns are the most 
popular arm for self-defense purposes. Interestingly, in making this 
assertion about the popularity of handguns, the Court cited only one 
source: the D.C. Circuit’s opinion below.65 That opinion, in turn, cites 
to a single academic paper to support that proposition.66 That paper 
compiled the results of several surveys from 1988 to 1993 in order to 
estimate the number of defensive uses of firearms in the United 
States during that period.67 However, as the authors of that paper 
admit, some of the surveys used to compile these estimates only 
asked about handguns while others asked about all guns. Thus the 
paper “did not separately establish how many of the [defensive gun 
use incidents] involved handguns and how many involved other 
types of guns.”68 
This is not to suggest that the Court’s conclusion that handguns 
are the most popular weapon for self-defense was wrong—it almost 
certainly was correct. Rather, the issue is that the Court’s cursory 
citation to the lower court’s mentioning this study does not provide 
any guidance about how the Court was applying the “common use” 
test to reach the conclusion it did. Did the Court find that handguns 
were the most commonly chosen weapon because handguns are the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 64. Id. at 629. 
 65. Id. at 628–29 (citing Parker v. D.C., 478 F.3d 370, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). 
 66. Parker, 478 F.3d at 400 (“Indeed, the pistol is the most preferred firearm in 
the nation to ‘keep’ and use for protection of one’s home and family.”) (citing Gary 
Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and Nature of Self-
Defense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150, 182–83 (1995)). 
 67. See Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence 
and Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150, 182–84 
(1995).  
 68. Id. at 164. Moreover, the larger conclusions and methodology of that paper 
have been subject to significant criticism since it was published. See, e.g., Egon D. 
Cohen & Kristina M. Johnson, The Restricted Firearms License: A Proposal to 
Preserve Second Amendment Rights and Reduce Gun Violence in the United States, 
31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. INTER ALIA 10, 11–12 & n.12 (2013), 
http://ylpr.yale.edu/inter_alia/restricted-firearms-license-proposal-preserve-second-
amendment-rights-and-reduce-gun. 
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weapon most often used in self-defense situations or simply because 
Americans most commonly purchase or own handguns for that 
purpose? Is survey data that is well over a decade old sufficient proof 
of today’s “common use?” These questions were left unanswered, and 
as discussed below, the Court’s lack of guidance has been reflected in 
lower courts’ unwillingness to deeply engage in common use 
analysis.69  
Justice Breyer’s dissent briefly critiqued the “common use” test, 
noting that it creates odd incentives for states: 
According to the majority’s reasoning, if Congress and the 
States lift restrictions on the possession and use of 
machineguns, and people buy machineguns to protect their 
homes, the Court will have to reverse course and find that 
the Second Amendment does, in fact, protect the individual 
self-defense-related right to possess a machinegun. On the 
majority’s reasoning, if tomorrow someone invents a 
particularly useful, highly dangerous self-defense weapon, 
Congress and the States had better ban it immediately, for 
once it becomes popular Congress will no longer possess the 
constitutional authority to do so. In essence, the majority 
determines what regulations are permissible by looking to 
see what existing regulations permit. There is no basis for 
believing that the Framers intended such circular 
reasoning.70 
However, Justice Breyer did not specifically suggest an 
alternative type of weapon test, despite describing his own “interest-
balancing” test that he would apply to Second Amendment claims 
generally.71 
Thus, while taking a monumental step in recognizing an 
individual Second Amendment right, the Court left lower courts with 
little to guide them in analyzing future claims—other than claims 
regarding handgun bans identical to the one in Heller—and even 
less guidance on how to decide what weapons are protected by the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 69. See infra Part IV. 
 70. Heller, 554 U.S. at 721 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 71. Justice Breyer proposed that courts apply something in between rational 
basis and strict scrutiny to Second Amendment claims—likely a form of intermediate 
scrutiny. Id. at 689–90 (suggesting that a court should not “effectively presume 
either constitutionality (as in rational-basis review) or unconstitutionality (as in 
strict scrutiny). Rather [a court should ask] whether the statute burdens a protected 
interest in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion to the statute’s salutary 
effects upon other important governmental interests.”). 
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Second Amendment. In McDonald v. City of Chicago,72 the Court’s 
only return to the Second Amendment since Heller, the Court found 
that the Second Amendment protects a fundamental right 
incorporated against state and local governments but did not provide 
any further insight into the appropriate analysis for Second 
Amendment cases or into the meaning of the “common use” test for 
arms described in Heller.73  
B.  The Two-Step Test  
Because the Supreme Court has not established a methodology 
for analyzing Second Amendment claims, lower courts have been 
given a wide berth to elaborate on the scope of the Second 
Amendment right recognized in Heller. Since Heller, all of the 
federal courts of appeal that have done any in-depth analysis of the 
Second Amendment have settled on some form of a two-part test 
that: (1) asks whether the law at issue burdens conduct protected by 
the Second Amendment and, if there is such a burden, (2), asks 
courts to apply an “appropriate” level of scrutiny given the severity 
of the burden on Second Amendment rights.74   
Critics of the two-step test—most of whom favor broader Second 
Amendment rights—prefer a “scope only” approach that would 
simply ask whether the law burdens the Second Amendment as the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 72. 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
 73. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 750, 767–68, 778. 
 74. See, e.g., Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & 
Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012) (noting that the two-step approach “has 
emerged as the prevailing approach” and adopting that approach), cert. denied, 134 
S. Ct. 1364 (2014); United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. 
denied, 133 S. Ct. 375 (2012); United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 22–26 (1st Cir. 
2011); Heller v. D.C. (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Ezell v. City of 
Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 700–04 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 
F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 
2010); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800–01 (10th Cir. 2010); see also United 
States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 166–69 (2d Cir. 2012) (adopting a “substantial 
burden” test where “heightened scrutiny is triggered only by those restrictions that 
(like the complete prohibition on handguns struck down in Heller) operate as a 
substantial burden on the ability of law-abiding citizens to possess and use a firearm 
for self-defense (or for other lawful purposes)”), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 838 (2013). 
The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have summarily rejected a few Second 
Amendment challenges to federal prohibitions on certain criminals possessing 
firearms and on the possession of particularly dangerous weapons, see, e.g., United 
States v. Bena, 664 F.3d 1180, 1182–85 (8th Cir. 2011); United States v. Rozier, 598 
F.3d 768, 770–71 (11th Cir. 2010), but have not yet engaged in an in-depth 
discussion of the standard of review for Second Amendment cases.  
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amendment was understood at the time of its ratification. 
Proponents of this approach argue that if a law prohibits conduct 
protected by the Second Amendment, it should be struck down 
without resort to the kind of “interest-balancing” the Heller majority 
expressly disclaimed.75 
In any case, courts that have applied the two-step approach as 
well as those arguing for the “scope only” approach both largely 
agree that the scope inquiry is determined by a historical analysis 
that looks at whether the challenged conduct was within the scope 
that the Second Amendment was understood to have at the time it 
was ratified and for at least some amount of time after ratification.76 
“It begins with the pre-ratification ‘historical background of the 
Second Amendment,’ since ‘the Second Amendment . . . codified a 
preexisting right.’ Next, it turns to whatever sources shed light on 
the ‘public understanding [of the Second Amendment] in the period 
after its enactment or ratification,’ such as nineteenth-century 
judicial interpretations and legal commentary.”77 
                                                                                                                 
 
 75. See, e.g., Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1271 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“In my 
view, Heller and McDonald leave little doubt that courts are to assess gun bans and 
regulations based on text, history, and tradition, not by a balancing test such as 
strict or intermediate scrutiny.”); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 24, Woollard v. 
Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013) (No. 13-42), 2013 WL 3484362, at *24 
(complaining that under the two-step approach “many courts simply dispense with 
the first step of discerning a right through interpretation, only assuming that a right 
(of abstract dimension) is implicated, thus carefully avoiding any holding that the 
right has any substantive content. By assuming, rather than finding and thus 
defining the right’s existence, courts reduce the right to a cypher that cannot 
withstand the second step’s application, always alleged to be intermediate 
scrutiny.”), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 422 (2013); see also Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 
742 F.3d 1144, 1168 (9th Cir. 2014) (arguing for using the scope only approach in the 
“most severe cases” that involve a “complete destruction” of Second Amendment 
rights), vacated and re’g en banc granted, 781 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2015); cf. Allen 
Rostron, supra note 43, at 706–07 (“The lower courts, frustrated by the 
indeterminacy of historical inquiry and puzzled by the categorizations suggested by 
Justice Scalia, have steered in other directions. They have effectively embraced the 
sort of interest-balancing approach that Justice Scalia condemned, adopting an 
intermediate scrutiny test and applying it in a way that is highly deferential to 
legislative determinations and that leads to all but the most drastic restrictions on 
guns being upheld.”). 
 76. See, e.g., Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1150–51; Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., 700 F.3d at 
194. 
 77. Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1151 (citations omitted) (alterations in original) 
(quoting D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008)). But see Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 
426, 433–34 (3d Cir. 2013) (noting that prohibitions on the possession of firearms by 
felons were found to be “longstanding” by Heller despite the fact that such 
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Once a court applying the two-step approach determines whether 
the law at issue burdens or regulates conduct protected by the 
Second Amendment, the court will then determine the proper level 
of scrutiny to apply to the law. The closer a law comes to burdening 
the “core” right identified in Heller—the right to possess a firearm 
for self-defense in the home—the higher the level of scrutiny applied 
to the law.78 Usually courts decline to apply rational basis scrutiny79 
to a law found to burden conduct protected by the Second 
Amendment (because that standard was specifically rejected by the 
majority in Heller) and instead will either apply strict or 
intermediate scrutiny,80 depending on the severity of the burden on 
Second Amendment rights.81 
This mode of analysis has led courts to apply intermediate 
scrutiny to most gun control laws that have been reviewed after 
Heller, because most of these laws either burden only conduct 
                                                                                                                 
 
prohibitions did not exist until the early twentieth century, and therefore, concluding 
that other prohibitions dating to that era could be considered “longstanding” and 
presumptively lawful), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2134 (2014). 
 78. See, e.g., United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(citation omitted) (“[T]he level of scrutiny should depend on (1) ‘how close the law 
comes to the core of the Second Amendment right,’ and (2) ‘the severity of the law’s 
burden on the right.’”); Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 93 & 93 n.17 
(2d Cir. 2012) (“Although we have no occasion to decide what level of scrutiny should 
apply to laws that burden the ‘core’ Second Amendment protection identified in 
Heller, we believe that applying less than strict scrutiny when the regulation does 
not burden the ‘core’ protection of self-defense in the home makes eminent sense in 
this context and is in line with the approach taken by our sister circuits.”) (collecting 
cases), cert denied, 133 S. Ct. 1806 (2013); Ezell v. City of Chi., 651 F.3d 684, 708 
(7th Cir. 2010) (“[A] severe burden on the core Second Amendment right of armed 
self-defense will require an extremely strong public-interest justification and a close 
fit between the government’s means and its end. Second, laws restricting activity 
lying closer to the margins of the Second Amendment right, laws that merely 
regulate rather than restrict, and modest burdens on the right may be more easily 
justified. How much more easily depends on the relative severity of the burden and 
its proximity to the core of the right.”). 
 79. Rational basis analysis places the burden on the challenger of a law to 
prove that the law is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. 
See, e.g., 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 860 (2009). 
 80. Intermediate scrutiny analysis places the burden on the government to 
show that the law is substantially related to an important governmental interest, 
while strict scrutiny places the burden on the government to show that the law is 
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. See, e.g., id. at §§ 
861–62. 
 81. See, e.g., Ezell, 651 F.3d at 706 (“Although the Supreme Court did not do so 
in either Heller or McDonald, the Court did make it clear that the deferential 
rational-basis standard is out, and with it the presumption of constitutionality.”).  
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outside the home or only regulate the possession of firearms by 
particular types of individuals. For example, laws regulating the 
carrying of firearms outside of the home—probably the most 
prominent issue in the courts since Heller—have received 
intermediate scrutiny in three courts of appeals.82 Similarly, every 
court of appeals that has reviewed the federal prohibition on 
domestic violence misdemeanants possessing firearms has upheld 
that law, applying some form of intermediate scrutiny.83 By contrast, 
the few laws that have been subjected to a strict scrutiny analysis 
(or some variation thereof) or that have been struck down using the 
“scope only” approach have usually been complete bans on the 
possession, sale, or use of firearms.84   
IV.  THE COMMON USE TEST APPLIED IN THE COURTS 
Comparatively few courts have tackled the issue of what types of 
weapons are protected by the Second Amendment. The courts that 
have—usually in the context of lawsuits challenging bans on assault 
weapons and large capacity magazines—hewed to the usual two-step 
analysis in analyzing these laws. When applied to type-of-weapon 
cases, the analysis usually asks (1) whether the type of weapon at 
issue is protected by the Second Amendment and (2) (assuming the 
first step found some level of protection) what level of scrutiny a ban 
on the type of weapon at issue warrants.   
                                                                                                                 
 
 82. See Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 96–97; Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 
(4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 422 (2013); Drake, 724 F.3d at 436. But see 
Peruta, 742 F.3d at 1173–79 (declining to apply intermediate scrutiny and invaliding 
a discretionary concealed licensing law using the scope only approach); Moore v. 
Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 2012) (striking down Illinois’ complete ban on 
carrying firearms outside the home and noting that “our analysis is not based on 
degrees of scrutiny, but on Illinois’s failure to justify the most restrictive gun law of 
any of the 50 states.”). 
 83. See, e.g., Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1138; United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 
25–26 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682–83 (4th Cir. 2010); 
United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 641–42 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 84. See, e.g., Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708–09 (requiring “a more rigorous showing 
than [intermediate scrutiny] . . . , if not quite ‘strict scrutiny’’’ when reviewing a total 
ban on firing ranges in the city of Chicago); Ill. Ass’n of Firearms Retailers v. City of 
Chi., 961 F. Supp. 2d 928, 939–40 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (applying a standard of review 
higher than intermediate scrutiny for a challenge to a Chicago ordinance banning 
virtually all gun sales in the City); Palmer v. D.C., 59 F. Supp. 3d 173, 182–83 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014) (finding that under any level of heightened scrutiny, the District of 
Columbia’s virtual total ban on carrying firearms outside the home would violate the 
Second Amendment). 
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In working through this analysis, courts have largely followed a 
familiar pattern. The first step of the two-step test is where courts 
have usually most directly wrestled with the “common use” test. In 
stark contrast to the often lengthy historical discussions that 
typically come in the first step of Second Amendment analysis, the 
application of the “common use” test by most courts has generally 
involved only brief citation to statistical evidence offered by the 
parties about the supposed prevalence of the weapons at issue. In 
the second step, courts have taken a broader focus and looked at 
such issues as the dangerousness of the banned weapons, and other 
avenues available for self-defense. Although these issues would 
naturally come up in the application of a level of scrutiny (i.e., to 
show the government’s need for the ban), courts have actually used 
these considerations frequently in selecting the appropriate level of 
scrutiny (i.e., in determining how much the right is burdened). 
Through this method, courts essentially end up determining the 
scope of the right primarily in the second step rather than the first.   
As demonstrated in the cases discussed below, courts’ 
unwillingness to deeply engage with the common use test and 
tendency to either (A) rationalize their results through the second 
step of the analysis or (B) ignore the common use test altogether 
reflects the profound unworkability of the common use test and its 
disconnection from the central right recognized in Heller. In only one 
case did the court meaningfully engage in a deep look at the common 
use test, and that analysis only serves to underscore the test’s 
problems when taken to its logical conclusions. 
A.  Heller II & NYSRPA—Using the Second Step to Fix the First Step 
In the most prominent case so far involving assault weapons and 
large capacity ammunition magazines, Heller v. District of Columbia 
(Heller II), the D.C. Circuit upheld the District of Columbia’s bans on 
these items in the face of a Second Amendment challenge.85 In 
determining whether the bans impinged on Second Amendment 
rights, the court found it “clear enough in the record that semi-
automatic rifles and magazines holding more than ten rounds are 
indeed in ‘common use.’”86 To support this conclusion, the court cited 
three statistics: (1) 1.6 million AR-15s have been manufactured since 
1986; (2) in 2007, AR-15s accounted for 5.5 percent of all firearms 
and 14.4 percent of all rifles produced in the U.S. for the domestic 
market; and (3) 18% of all firearms owned by civilians in 1994 were 
                                                                                                                 
 
 85. Heller v. D.C. (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1247–48 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
 86. Id. at 1261. 
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equipped with magazines holding more than ten rounds, and 
approximately 4.7 million more such magazines were imported into 
the United States between 1995 and 2000.87 
The citation of these facts raises several questions about what 
the common use test really means. Why is the manufacture of 1.6 
million AR-15s since 1986 significant when there are over 300 
million civilian firearms in circulation in the United States?88 How 
can a firearm that represents less than half of one percent of all 
firearms be considered in “common use”? Of course, the 1.6 million 
figure is probably both over and under-inclusive for purposes of this 
analysis since some AR-15s would not qualify as “assault weapons” 
under Washington D.C.’s law89 and because there are other types of 
assault weapons besides AR-15s.   
As for the second manufacturing statistic, why is that relevant to 
determining common use? Manufacturing does not necessarily 
reflect whether a firearm will ultimately be sold. Moreover, why only 
focus on the year 2007 (four years prior to the case being decided) 
and why only on domestic manufacturing? Why is the percentage of 
rifles specifically relevant? Is there some independent right to 
possess commonly used rifles? Finally, even taking all of the figures 
at face value, why is 5.5% or even 14.4% significant enough to 
constitute common use? The magazine figures raise even more 
questions. Why rely on such dated figures? Why rely solely on import 
data when so many firearms are manufactured domestically? 90   
                                                                                                                 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. See, e.g., Don B. Kates & Carlisle Moody, Heller, McDonald, and Murder: 
Testing the More Guns = More Murder Thesis, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1421, 1445 
(2012); Blaire Briody & Maureen Mackey, 19 Unbelievable Facts About Guns in 
America, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 19, 2012, 9:53 AM), http://www.businessinsider. 
com/unbelievable-facts-about-guns-in-america-2012-12. 
 89. The District of Columbia’s assault weapons ban, like many others, prohibits 
semi-automatic rifles with one of a list of enumerated features. D.C. CODE § 7-
2501.01(3A)(A)(i)(IV) (LexisNexis 2001 & Supp. 2015). Gun manufacturers have 
responded to these bans by marketing “compliant” versions of popular guns, 
including variants on the AR-15, that are different from the ordinary versions of 
these guns only in the sense that they lack any of the banned features. See, e.g., 
M&P Rifles: State Complaint, SMITH & WESSON, http://www.smith-wesson.com 
/webapp/wcs/stores/servlet/Category4_750001_750051_772659_-1_757784_757784_ 
image (last visited Dec. 25, 2015).  
 90. See JURGEN BRAUER, SMALL ARMS SURVEY, THE US FIREARMS INDUSTRY 
PRODUCTION AND SUPPLY 45 (2013), available at http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/ 
fileadmin/docs/F-Working-papers/SAS-WP14-US-Firearms-Industry.pdf (finding that 
the number of firearms produced domestically was greater than the number of 
firearms imported into the United States in every year from 1999 through 2010).  
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The court did not answer any of these questions, but seemed to 
implicitly recognize some of the difficulty with its assertion by noting 
that “based upon the record as it stands [the court] cannot be certain 
whether these weapons are commonly used or are useful specifically 
for self-defense or hunting and therefore whether the 
prohibitions . . . meaningfully affect the right to keep and bear 
arms.”91 This statement is also interesting in that the court appears 
to conflate the distinction between a weapon simply being 
“commonly used” and being useful for self-defense or hunting. 
Obviously, these two things are very different because a weapon 
could be useful for self-defense and be uncommon, or vice versa. The 
court did not explore the issue further and declined to resolve the 
question, instead assuming that the prohibitions did impinge on 
Second Amendment rights and moving on to the next step of the 
analysis: selecting an appropriate level of scrutiny.92 
In determining the appropriate level of scrutiny, the court relied, 
in several ways, on the nature of the banned weapons and 
magazines. The court noted that, unlike the law in Heller, the law 
here did not prohibit the possession of “the quintessential self-
defense weapon, to wit, the handgun” and that the ban did not 
prevent people from owning other “suitable and commonly used 
weapon[s] for protection in the home,” such as long guns that lack 
the prohibited features.93 Thus, the court found that while it could 
not say whether the prohibitions impinged at all on a right protected 
by the Second Amendment, it was reasonably certain that the bans 
did not substantially burden that right.94 In support of this 
argument, the court cited the same defensive gun use statistics 
relied upon in Heller to show that most instances of defensive gun 
use were accomplished with handguns.95 Accordingly, the court 
found the appropriate standard of review was intermediate scrutiny 
and went on to uphold the law as reasonably related to the District 
of Columbia’s interest in public safety. 
This application of the second step of the analysis is also 
puzzling. The first step is supposed to be an identification of the 
right at issue, with the second step simply asking how much the 
right that is identified and described in the first step is burdened. 
Because the court assumed in the first step that large capacity 
ammunition magazines and assault weapons were protected by the 
Second Amendment, the second step question—how much the right 
                                                                                                                 
 
 91. Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1261. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 1261–62 (citing D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008)). 
 94. Id. at 1261. 
 95. Id. (citing Kleck & Gertz, supra note 67, at 177, 185). 
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identified in the first step is burdened—should have had an easy 
answer: a lot, because those items are completely banned under the 
District of Columbia’s laws. Such an answer probably would have led 
to the application of strict scrutiny. Instead, the court’s supposed 
inquiry into how much the bans burdened Second Amendment rights 
more closely resembled what the first step is supposed to be—an 
inquiry into whether the Second Amendment protects the conduct at 
issue at all. In making that determination, the court was able to 
dispense with the “common use” test and focus instead on other 
questions about these weapons and magazines, such as how often 
they are actually used in self-defense and whether alternative 
“suitable and commonly used” weapons were still available for home 
self-protection under the District of Columbia’s laws.96 
After Heller II, in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n Inc. v. 
Cuomo (NYSRPA),97 the Second Circuit upheld new laws in New 
York and Connecticut banning assault weapons and large capacity 
magazines. The laws were enacted in the wake of the Sandy Hook 
Elementary School shooting.98 Like the court in Heller II, the Second 
Circuit assumed that the guns and magazines at issue were 
protected by the Second Amendment and, applying intermediate 
scrutiny, upheld the bans.99 
                                                                                                                 
 
 96. As the dissent pointed out, it is unclear why the argument that other kinds 
of firearms are still legal is persuasive here when it was not persuasive in Heller 
itself (where the government unsuccessfully attempted to rely on the continued 
legality of long-guns). See id. at 1290 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). This further 
suggests that the court was really arguing that these guns and magazines—unlike 
the handguns in Heller—were outside the scope of the Second Amendment.  
 97. 804 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 98. Both laws added to existing prohibitions in those states. New York already 
banned semi-automatic rifles with at least two “military-style” features, but its new 
law expanded the definition of assault weapon to include semi-automatic rifles with 
only one such feature. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 990 F. Supp. 2d 
349, 355–56 (W.D.N.Y. 2013) aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 804 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2015). 
New York also previously banned large capacity ammunition magazines, but its new 
law eliminated a “grandfather” clause that allowed New Yorkers to keep magazines 
manufactured prior to 1994. Id. at 356–57. Connecticut also moved from a “two 
feature” to a “one feature” test for its assault weapons ban but its restriction on large 
capacity ammunition magazines was new. See Shew v. Malloy, 994 F. Supp. 2d 234, 
240–41 & n.19 (D. Conn. 2014) aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. New York State 
Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2015).  
 99. See NYSRPA, 804 F.3d at 257, 260–64. The court struck down a separate 
provision that required magazines to only be loaded with no more than seven 
cartridges at one time, except when at a shooting range. Id. at 264. The court found 
that the state had failed to sufficiently justify the load limit since ten round 
magazines would remain in circulation under the laws, making the load limit 
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In NYSRPA, the court broke the “scope of the right” portion of its 
analysis into two parts—whether the guns and magazines were in 
common use and whether they were “typically possessed by law-
abiding citizens for lawful purposes.”100 In analyzing common use, 
the court reviewed more evidence about common use than in Heller 
II, likely because of the development on both sides of better research 
into the issue in the years after Heller II. In addition to the data 
relied on by the Heller II court in NYSRPA had before it 
manufacturing data about the number of AR-15 type rifles 
manufactured for the domestic market,101 the percentage of firearm 
sales AR-15s accounted for in 2011, the fact that many popular 
firearms are designed for use with large capacity ammunition 
magazines, the fact that one study estimated that there were one 
million privately owned assault weapons in the United States in 
1990, and the fact that as of 2000, nearly 50 million large capacity 
ammunition magazines had been approved for import into the 
United States.102 The court also considered evidence offered by the 
plaintiffs that a plurality of responders to an online survey of owners 
of AR-15 type guns indicated that they only owned one such weapon, 
which the plaintiffs argued indicated widespread ownership.103 The 
defendants countered with an estimate finding assault weapons only 
account for roughly 2% of all guns owned in the United States.104   
                                                                                                                 
 
unlikely to have much practical impact. See id. This is noteworthy because it appears 
to be the closest a court has come, since Heller, to striking down a “type of weapon” 
restriction on Second Amendment grounds; although, this restriction was really on 
behavior (loading extra rounds) not on the type of equipment a person could possess. 
The court also held Connecticut’s specific ban on the Remington Tactical Rifle Model 
7615, a pump-action (not semi-automatic) rifle, unconstitutional because of the 
state’s failure to present arguments defending its constitutionality on appeal. Id. at 
250 n.17, 257 n.73, 262 n.112, 265.  
 100. Id. at 254–55. 
 101. Id. at 255. Interestingly, the number the court relied upon came from a 
declaration offered by the plaintiffs saying that 3.97 million AR-15 type rifles had 
been manufactured since 1986. Shew, 994 F. Supp. 2d at 245 & nn.40–41; NYSRPA, 
990 F. Supp. 2d at 364. While this appears to conflict with the statement in Heller II 
that only 1.6 million AR-15s had been manufactured since 1986, the discrepancy is 
probably explained by the NYSRPA declaration’s broader focus on all “AR-15 type 
rifles.” See NYSRPA, 990 F. Supp. 2d, at 364 (emphasis added) (“Though the mark 
‘AR-15’ is Colt’s, many manufacturers make a similar firearm.”).  
 102. See NYSRPA, 804 F.3d at 255; Shew, 994 F. Supp. 2d at 245–46 & nn.40–
41; NYSRPA, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 364–65. 
 103. NYSRPA, 804 F.3d at 255; Joint Appendix at 155–64, New York State Rifle 
& Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-0036). 
 104. NYSRPA, 804 F.3d at 255. 
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Just like in Heller II, the citation to this evidence raised many of 
the same puzzling questions about the common use test and how the 
Second Circuit was applying it. The court did not make much of an 
effort to address these questions directly. The NYSRPA court simply 
concluded—after reciting some of the statistics above—that the 
banned weapons were in common use because millions of them exist 
in the United States even according to “the most conservative 
estimates cited by the parties.”105 The court did not explain why 
possession by a few million Americans was sufficient to qualify as 
“common use.” Nor did either court explain which of the statistics 
offered were relevant to the common use test and which were not (or 
which had the most weight). 
The court was less sure of itself in looking at the second part of 
the scope inquiry—whether the weapons were “typically possessed” 
for lawful purposes—and followed the path of Heller II by assuming 
without deciding that the weapons were typically possessed for such 
purposes.106 Thus, the court assumed that the bans did prohibit 
conduct within the scope of the Second Amendment.107   
After making that assumption, the court went on to find that 
intermediate scrutiny was the appropriate standard to apply to the 
bans. The court largely tracked the reasoning in Heller II, finding 
that the law did not warrant strict scrutiny because it did not 
“effectively disarm” individuals or prohibit an “entire class of arms” 
because other protected arms, including semi-automatic weapons 
without prohibited features, were still available.108 Interestingly, the 
court suggested another reason for applying intermediate scrutiny 
was that the weapons prohibited by these laws were not as popular 
as the handguns at issue in Heller.109 Applying intermediate 
scrutiny, the court upheld the bans based on the public safety 
justifications offered by Connecticut and New York.110 
The application of intermediate scrutiny in NYSRPA is puzzling 
for the same reasons it was in Heller II. After the courts found (or 
assumed) that the laws at issue completely banned weapons that are 
protected by the Second Amendment, it should have been an easy 
decision to apply strict scrutiny. The choice to apply intermediate 
scrutiny instead seems motivated by some doubt on the part of the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 105. See NYSRPA, 804 F.3d at 255–56. 
 106. Id. at 256–58. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 258–61 (citing Heller v. D.C. (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1262 (D.C. 
Cir. 2011)). 
 109. See NYSRPA, 804 F.3d at 260 n.98. 
 110. Id. at 261–64. 
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court that the weapons at issue should receive Second Amendment 
protection at all. If these courts really believed that assault weapons 
and large capacity ammunition magazines were protected, then 
these cases should not have been unlike Heller itself where one 
commonly used type of arm (handguns) was completely banned 
while another type (long guns) remained legal.111   
The fairly deferential intermediate scrutiny that was applied to 
the laws in NYSRPA and Heller II that considered available self-
defense alternatives can only be harmonized with the much harsher 
treatment the law received in Heller by some difference in the 
weapons at issue. In order to reconcile this disparate treatment, 
something about the assault weapons and large capacity 
ammunition magazines in the former cases would, in the eyes of 
courts, have to make them less worthy of protection than the 
handguns in the latter. The courts do not say what this is,112 but I 
think it reflects these courts’ serious misgivings about whether they 
were applying the common use test correctly in finding these 
weapons protected in the first place,113 given all the questions about 
the test that were left unanswered in Heller, the lack of reliable data 
on the market share of different types of firearms, and, perhaps, 
underlying disagreement with the common use test itself.  
B.  James & Kampfer — Ignoring the Common Use Test and 
Replacing it with Danger Prevention and Alternative Means Analysis 
Other courts have been more obvious in their reluctance to apply 
the common use test. In People v. James,114 the California Court of 
Appeal rejected a Second Amendment challenge to the state’s ban on 
                                                                                                                 
 
 111. See supra Part III.A.2.  
 112. Though Heller II does compare the frequency with which assault weapons 
are used defensively to the frequency of defensive handgun use. See Heller II, 670 
F.3d at 1262. 
 113. This is reflected in the NYSRPA court’s argument that bans on assault 
weapons and large capacity ammunition magazines are not deserving of strict 
scrutiny because those weapons are less popular than handguns. See NYSRPA, 804 
F.3d at 260 n.98. At least one court has looked at much of the same evidence as 
Heller II and NYSRPA and expressed “serious[] doubts” about whether assault 
weapons are protected by the Second Amendment at all. See Kolbe v. O’Malley, 42 F. 
Supp. 3d 768, 788–89 (D. Md. 2014) (“[A]ssault weapons represent no more than 3% 
of the current civilian gun stock, and ownership of those weapons is highly 
concentrated in less than 1% of the U.S. population.”). However, that court still 
applied a similar mode of analysis to Heller II and NYSRPA because it assumed that 
the banned weapons were protected by the Second Amendment and upheld the ban 
under intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 789–91, 793 n.33, 797. 
 114. 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 576 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 
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assault weapons and .50 caliber rifles (rifles capable of utilizing 
particularly large and destructive cartridges).115 The court dispensed 
with the case by finding that the bans simply did not prohibit 
firearms that were protected by the Second Amendment.116 
While the court paid lip service to the “common use” test,117 its 
analysis essentially ignored it. Instead, the court described some of 
the dangerous features of these guns that the legislature was 
concerned about when it enacted the bans, including the high rate of 
fire of assault weapons and the capability of a .50 caliber rifle to 
destroy or damage buildings and vehicles.118 From those facts, the 
court concluded that “[t]hese are not the types of weapons typically 
possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes such as sport 
hunting or self-defense; rather, these are weapons of war. . . ” and 
thus “fall within the category of dangerous and unusual weapons 
that the government can prohibit for individual use.”119 
While the evidence before the California Legislature and the 
James court may have shown that these weapons were dangerous, it 
had no bearing on whether these weapons were also unusual (i.e., 
not in common use). Surely, a weapon could be both very dangerous 
and in common use. The James court elided that distinction by 
focusing on the question of dangerousness and ignoring the question 
of unusualness completely. 
Similarly, in Kampfer v. Cuomo,120 another challenge to New 
York’s post–Newtown assault weapons ban, the federal district court 
did not even mention the common use test.121 Instead, in the first 
step of its analysis, the court focused entirely on whether alternative 
arms remained available for self-defense, arguing that “any burden 
upon the possession of an ‘assault weapon’ is relevant only insofar as 
it generally impacts one’s ability to possess arms.”122 Because the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 115. A cartridge is a metallic package containing “a bullet, case, powder, and 
primer,” in simpler terms, a bullet and propellant. See, e.g., VIN SPARANO, 
Cartridges, in THE COMPLETE OUTDOORS ENCYCLOPEDIA, 36, 36–37 (St. Martin’s 
Griffin rev. ed. 2000).  
 116. James, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 586.  
 117. Id. at 585 (describing the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller as 
“the right to possess and carry weapons typically possessed by law-abiding citizens 
for lawful purposes such as self-defense”) (citing D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–30 
(2008)). 
 118. Id. at 585–86. 
 119. Id. at 586. 
 120. 993 F. Supp. 2d 188 (N.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 121. Unlike the plaintiffs in NYSRPA, the plaintiff in Kampfer did not challenge 
New York’s ban on large capacity ammunition magazines. See id. at 193 n.6. 
 122. Id. at 195 n.10. 
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court found that “ample firearms remain[ed] available to carry out 
the ‘central component’ of the Second Amendment right[,] self-
defense,” the court held that New York’s assault weapons ban did 
not impose a substantial burden on Second Amendment rights and 
essentially ended its analysis there.123 
While James and Kampfer’s explicit replacement of the common 
use test with different inquiries about dangerousness and 
alternative means is probably not consistent with Heller, their 
shirking of the common use test at least has the virtue of being more 
transparent than the sleight of hand pulled off by the courts in 
Heller II and NYSRPA. The courts in both of the former cases put 
the question of whether the weapons were covered by the Second 
Amendment squarely where it logically belongs, in the first part of 
the two-step analysis.124 In doing so, these courts made explicit what 
was implicit in the Heller II type cases: Assault weapons should not 
qualify for Second Amendment protection. 
Nevertheless, these cases are still unsatisfying in that they fail 
to provide any explanation for why they depart from the common use 
inquiry. Moreover, the alternative tests those courts utilize present 
pose problems of their own. In the case of a pure dangerousness test, 
it seems unlikely that the law in Heller itself would have been struck 
down under such a test because handguns are used very commonly 
by criminals and have proven to be quite dangerous.125 Similarly, a 
test centered only on alternative means also suggests a different 
outcome in Heller since long guns remained available under the 
District’s handgun ban.126 More broadly, even a ban on all firearms 
might survive such a test since other arms, such as knives and 
tasers, might remain available.127     
                                                                                                                 
 
 123. See id. at 196 (quoting D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008)). 
 124. See, e.g., James, 174 Cal. App. 4th at 676–77. James was decided prior to 
the two-step test becoming widely used and did not explicitly mention such a test, 
but its analysis clearly reflects the kind of “scope of the right” inquiry that is now the 
hallmark of the first step of that test. 
 125. See Heller v. D.C. (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (noting that “semi-automatic handguns are more 
dangerous as a class than semi-automatic rifles because handguns can be concealed 
. . . .” and that handguns ‘are the overwhelmingly favorite weapon of armed 
criminals.’”). 
 126. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 575. 
 127. See David B. Kopel et al., Knives and the Second Amendment, 47 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 167, 191–99 (2013); Ron F. Wright, Note, Shocking the Second 
Amendment: Invalidating States’ Prohibitions on Taser with the District of Columbia 
v. Heller, 20 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 159, 176 (2010). 
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C.  Fyock—Engaging With The Common Use Test 
One characteristic all the cases discussed above share is that 
they fail to meaningfully engage with questions about what the 
common use test really means. An exception to this trend is Fyock v. 
City of Sunnyvale,128 which was a case from the Northern District of 
California dealing with a Second Amendment challenge to a 
California city’s ordinance prohibiting the possession of large 
capacity ammunition magazines.129 Although the court ultimately 
denied the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction enjoining 
the law, the court did find that large capacity ammunition 
magazines were in common use and therefore protected by the 
Second Amendment.130 Along the way, the court raised and 
answered some interesting questions about how it was applying the 
common use test. 
Like the courts in Heller II and similar cases, the court cited 
statistical evidence offered by the plaintiffs that large capacity 
magazines are commonly owned, including a declaration alleging 
that large capacity ammunition magazines make up approximately 
47% of all magazines owned nationwide and evidence showing that 
many of the semi-automatic rifles and handguns currently for sale to 
consumers are sold with large capacity ammunition magazines.131 
However, the court also noted that “[b]oth parties admit[ted] that 
reliable data on the number of the banned magazines owned by 
individuals does not exist.”132 The court nevertheless found it “safe to 
say that whatever the actual number of such magazines in United 
States consumers’ hands is, it is in the tens-of-millions, even under 
the most conservative estimates.”133 
The defendants argued that the court should apply a local test 
and conclude that such magazines could not be in common use in 
California because their sale (though not their possession) had been 
banned in California—through a combination of state and federal 
laws—since 1994.134 The court rejected that argument because the 
“Supreme Court [in Heller] did not define the common use test as a 
local test, but rather evaluated common use as a national 
test . . . .”135 The court further asserted that any local test would not 
                                                                                                                 
 
 128. 25 F. Supp. 3d 1267 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 129. See id. at 1272–73. 
 130. See id. at 1275–77. 
 131. See id. at 1275. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id.  
 134. See id. at 1275–76. 
 135. Id. Although Heller referred to handguns as “the most preferred firearm in 
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make sense because it would lead to the scope of individuals’ Second 
Amendment rights varying based on location, which would not be 
consistent with safeguarding individual rights equally throughout 
the United States.136 
The court also rejected an argument that even if large capacity 
ammunition magazines are commonly owned, they are not 
commonly used for self-defense.137 The court found—in a departure 
from the apparent view of the court in Heller II—that under the 
common use test, “the standard is [solely] whether the [weapons at 
issue] are ‘typically possessed by law abiding citizens for lawful 
purposes,’ not whether the [weapons] are often used for self-
defense.”138 The court explained that most people never need to 
discharge a firearm in self-defense at all, but that this fact “should 
be celebrated” rather than used as a basis to limit the protections of 
the Second Amendment.139 Thus, the court found that large capacity 
ammunition magazines were protected by the Second 
Amendment.140 
However, like the courts that employ the Heller II style 
methodology, the court concluded that intermediate scrutiny was the 
appropriate standard to apply to the ban largely because of the 
availability of alternative weapons.141 The court observed that 
“[m]agazines having a capacity to accept more than ten rounds are 
hardly crucial for citizens to exercise their right to bear arms.”142 
Rather, “[i]ndividuals have countless other handgun and magazine 
options to exercise their Second Amendment rights.”143 Accordingly, 
the court concluded that the ban only imposed a “light” burden on 
                                                                                                                 
 
the nation to ‘keep’ and use for protection of one’s home and family,” the Court did 
not explicitly describe the common use test as a national standard. See D.C. v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–29 (2008) (emphasis added). 
 136. See Fyock, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 1276. But see Joseph Blocher, Firearm 
Localism, 123 YALE L.J. 82, 124–32 (2013) (noting the prevalence of local variation in 
the enforcement of constitutional rights in other areas and suggesting that such 
variation may be particularly desirable in Second Amendment analysis). 
 137. See Fyock, 25 F. Supp. 3d at 1276. 
 138. See id. (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 625). 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 1277. The court also rejected an argument that magazines are not 
arms at all. See id. at 1276. The court found ammunition magazines must be 
protected by the Second Amendment because they are “integral components to vast 
categories of guns.” Id. 
 141. See id. at 1278–79. 
 142. Id. at 1278. 
 143. Id. 
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Second Amendment rights and applied intermediate scrutiny to 
uphold the ban based on its connection to preserving public safety.144 
The court’s analysis in Fyock takes the common use test to its 
logical conclusion: Any weapon that is sufficiently popular with the 
public (on a nationwide basis) is subject to Second Amendment 
protection, regardless of the weapon’s usefulness or necessity for 
adequate self-defense.145 While the court was more honest than 
other courts about the true meaning of the common use test, the 
court’s choice to apply an alternative means analysis in the second 
step of its reasoning shows that it was just as eager to blunt the 
impact of the common use test as other courts.146  
As described in the following section, courts’ reluctance to apply 
the common use test forthrightly is a reflection of the test’s 
unworkable nature, tendency to create undesirable incentives, and 
inadequacy to protect the Second Amendment right recognized in 
Heller.   
V.  THE COMMON USE TEST’S FLAWS & THE REASONABLE SELF-
DEFENSE APPROACH 
As the discussion above demonstrates, courts have had a difficult 
time applying the common use test in a coherent and intellectually 
honest way. In this section, I will demonstrate why those difficulties 
are not caused by the Supreme Court’s failure to adequately explain 
the test, but instead reflect fundamental problems with the test 
itself. Next, I will outline some of the alternatives to the common use 
test proposed in recent scholarship and explain why they are 
unpersuasive. Finally, I will propose my own test for analyzing type-
of-weapon claims: Whether the weapon at issue is consistent with 
reasonable self-defense. 
A.  The Problems with The Common Use Test  
While Heller left many questions unanswered about the common 
use test, the lower courts’ subsequent applications of the test, 
particularly in the Fyock decision, provide a reasonably clear picture 
of what the common use test actually requires. Moreover, unlike the 
courts, legal scholars have more willingly engaged in detailed 
applications of the common use test to particular weapons.147 These 
                                                                                                                 
 
 144. See id. at 1278–79. 
 145. See id. at 1277. 
 146. See id. at 1278. 
 147. See, e.g., Kopel, supra note 127, at 191–96 (arguing that knives are 
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articles elucidate further what Fyock, and, to a less explicit extent, 
Heller II and similar cases suggest: The common use test is a mere 
gauge of the current total ownership in the United States of the 
weapon at issue. 
The common use test essentially asks courts to look at evidence 
about the number of the particular firearm or firearm accessory148 at 
issue owned by private citizens149 in the United States for lawful 
purposes such as self-defense150 at the time the case is decided. As 
discussed above, in Heller II, NYSRPA, and Fyock, the courts relied 
on evidence that usually was offered as indirect proof of those 
numbers, such as manufacturing and sales statistics.151 From this 
data, courts make a determination about whether the guns or gun 
accessories are sufficiently popular to warrant protection, usually 
finding such protection when the number of weapons in private 
hands reaches into the “tens-of-millions” range.152 
                                                                                                                 
 
protected by the Second Amendment); Dan Terzian, The Right to Bear (Robotic) 
Arms, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 755, 770–73 (2013) (admitting that robotic arms 
probably do not qualify for protection under the common use test today but arguing 
that they will “edge toward” qualifying for protection in the future, assuming they 
are not banned); Lindsay Colvin, Note, History, Heller, and High-Capacity 
Magazines: What Is the Proper Standard of Review for Second Amendment 
Challenges?, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1041, 1069 (2014) (arguing that large capacity 
ammunition magazines qualify for protection under the common use test); Peter 
Jensen-Haxel, Comment, 3D Printers, Obsolete Firearm Supply Controls, and the 
Right to Build Self-Defense Weapons Under Heller, 42 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 447, 
485–93 (2012) (discussing the potential application of the common use test to 
weapons manufactured using 3D printing technology); Wright, supra note 127, at 
181–89 (arguing that tasers qualify for protection under the common use test).  
 148. There has been some discussion about the level of generality to be applied 
in determining whether a particular weapon is in common use. See, e.g., Volokh, 
supra note 24, at 1479 (“How common a weapon is depends on how specifically it is 
defined. Handguns are in common use, but particular brands of handguns are less 
common, and some are uncommon, simply because they come from small companies 
or are of unusual caliber or design.”); Jensen-Haxel, supra note 147, at 486–88, 487 
n.257. 
 149. See Colvin, supra note 147, at 1050–51 (“The Court [in Heller] rejected the 
notion that the common user includes military organizations . . . .”). 
 150. Most courts have analyzed the lawful use factor separately. A notable 
exception is NYSRPA and that court ultimately had to just assume this factor was 
present because of a lack of reliable data on the uses of the weapons at issue. See 
NYSRPA, 804 F.3d at 256–57.  
 151. See discussion supra Part IV. 
 152. See, e.g., Fyock v. City of Sunnyvale, 25 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1275 (N.D. Cal. 
2014). This is one area that the courts and subsequent scholarship have not filled in 
about the common use test—the exact quantum of popularity required for a weapon 
to enter common use. However, I maintain that no matter how this or any other gap 
2015] SECOND AMENDMENT “TYPE OF WEAPON” ANALYSIS 35 
 
This test has at least five critical flaws. First, it gives the 
government the ability to essentially freeze the right where it now 
stands by preventing new firearms from becoming popular and 
therefore protected (the under-protection problem). Second, it gives 
the firearm industry the ability to unilaterally make new firearms 
protected simply by manufacturing and heavily marketing them (the 
overprotection problem). Third, while the idea of linking the scope of 
the right to the choice of the people is superficially appealing, the 
advantages of doing so are lessened in this context, especially since 
the test does not necessarily even reflect what it purports to reflect—
the average person’s firearm of choice (the public choice fallacy). 
Fourth, reliable data on which firearms are possessed most 
commonly by Americans does not exist and is not likely to exist in 
the future (the data problem). Fifth, the test is not commanded by 
the text or history of the Second Amendment; instead, it is simply 
the result of a poor attempt to harmonize Heller’s holding with other 
precedent (the doctrinal problem). 
1.   The Under-Protection Problem 
As many have pointed out, the common use test creates an 
incentive for governments that are interested in restricting access to 
firearms to ban new weapons completely before they can become 
popular.153 If a new firearm that is extremely effective for self-
defense is invented, and Congress immediately bans its use 
nationwide, it could never become commonly possessed for self-
defense simply because Congress decided to ban it.154 Even more 
                                                                                                                 
 
in the test is filled in, the test will remain fatally flawed. See discussion infra 
subsections V.A.1–4. 
 153. See, e.g., Craig S. Lerner & Nelson Lund, Heller and Nonlethal Weapons, 60 
HASTINGS L.J. 1387, 1393 (2009) (“Justice Scalia’s test empowers Congress to create 
its own exceptions to the Second Amendment so long as the Supreme Court waits 
awhile before it checks to see whether particular weapons are in common civilian 
use.”); Terzian, supra note 147, at 770 & n.114 (collecting sources); Colvin, supra 
note 147, at 1051; Wright, supra note 127, at 181 n.131; see also D.C. v. Heller, 554 
U.S. 570, 721 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“On the majority’s reasoning, if 
tomorrow someone invents a particularly useful, highly dangerous self-defense 
weapon, Congress and the States had better ban it immediately, for once it becomes 
popular Congress will no longer possess the constitutional authority to do so. In 
essence, the majority determines what regulations are permissible by looking to see 
what existing regulations permit. There is no basis for believing that the Framers 
intended such circular reasoning.”).  
 154. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 721. 
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troubling, consider the hypothetical proposed by Professors Craig 
Lerner and Nelson Lund: 
Suppose, for example, that the federal handgun ban imposed 
in the District of Columbia in 1976 had been applied by 
Congress to the entire nation that same year. If a case 
challenging the ban had not reached the Supreme Court until 
2008, it would presumably have been upheld under the 
[common use] test . . . . 155       
Could it be that the outcome of a case that is often used as the 
gold standard of the originalist interpretive methodology156 turned, 
not on the original understanding of the constitutional text in 1791, 
but on a policy decision made by Congress in the last few decades? 
That is exactly the direction in which the common use test points. 
For obvious reasons, it is very troubling to give Congress the 
power to control the scope of the right guaranteed by the Second 
Amendment or any other enumerated constitutional right. The Bill 
of Rights in general, and the Second Amendment, in particular, are 
supposed to act as restraints on the power of Congress in order to 
protect individual liberty. Indeed, in an oft quoted passage from 
Heller, the majority declares that “[c]onstitutional rights are 
enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the 
people adopted them, whether or not future legislatures or (yes) even 
future judges think that scope too broad.”157 But under the common 
use test, future Congresses have quite a bit of power to control the 
scope of the right. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 155. Lerner & Lund, supra note 153, at 1393. Another article provides a more 
futuristic hypothetical illustrating the problem:  
Suppose a new weapon is designed that emits a laser beam and is 
absolutely non-lethal. A legislature could immediately and completely ban 
the weapon before it reaches the masses and would theoretically be 
permissible to do so under Heller. While the firearms of Heller have been 
circulating in the public for centuries, our hypothetical laser weapon would 
never have a chance to become ‘common’ enough to [satisfy the common use 
test] . . . . 
Wright, supra note 127, at 181 n.131. 
 156. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, News Flash: The Constitution Means What It 
Says, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2008, at A13 (“Justice Scalia’s opinion is the finest 
example of what is now called ‘original public meaning’ jurisprudence ever adopted 
by the Supreme Court.”). 
 157. Heller, 554 U.S. at 634–35. 
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Moreover, because courts have interpreted the common use test 
(probably correctly)158 to be a question about national common use 
as opposed to state-wide or local common use,159 the test places this 
power to define the scope of the arms protected by the Second 
Amendment solely in the hands of the federal government rather 
than state or local governments. If granting such power to the 
government were proper at all, it would make little sense to give it to 
the federal government but not to state governments, particularly 
given state (and local) governments’ traditional leading roles in 
setting firearms policy.160 This dichotomy also undermines the idea, 
which is repeated throughout McDonald, that the Second 
Amendment right—like others in the Bill of Rights—should apply to 
the states with the same strength as it applies to the federal 
government, rather than in a less strong, “watered-down” form.161 
The common use test turns this concern on its head, applying a 
watered down version of the Second Amendment to the federal 
government and a stronger version to the states.   
Finally, giving any government this power creates an incentive 
for ineffective regulation of firearms and makes compromise less 
likely in the gun debate. It would be rational under this test for 
policy makers favoring stronger gun control laws to push 
aggressively for outright bans of new firearms and to be less inclined 
to consider alternative forms of regulation. This is because if sales of 
a new firearm are allowed and it becomes popular enough to gain 
constitutional protection, then any regulations on that firearm could 
become jeopardized. Making the battle over each new weapon an “all 
or nothing” fight will lead policymakers away from careful 
individualized consideration of each weapon, which all sides would 
likely agree is not a smart way to making gun policy. 
2.  The Over-Protection Problem 
A similar problem that has gotten much less attention is that the 
common use test leads to the protection of guns that really should 
not be protected (or at least could lead to them being protected for 
the wrong reasons). The test does this by putting a great deal of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 158. After all, as Lerner & Lund’s hypothetical demonstrates, a local test would 
probably have resulted in Heller itself coming out differently. See Lerner & Lund, 
supra note 153, at 1393. 
 159. See discussion of Fyock, supra Section IV.C. 
 160. See Blocher, supra note 136, at 107–121 (describing “urban gun control” as 
a “nationwide phenomenon” in the founding era and the following century and noting 
that the first major federal gun control law was not enacted until the 1930s). 
 161. See McDonald v. City of Chi., 561 U.S. 742, 765 (2010). 
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power into the hands of gun manufacturers and more pro-gun states. 
It also may hinder efforts to require consumer safety features on 
guns.   
As the story of the exploding popularity of assault weapons 
discussed in Section II.A, supra, demonstrates, the gun industry has 
the ability to flood the market with new, deadlier weapons in a very 
short time frame. The common use test will give the industry even 
more incentive to do just that. By quickly bringing new weapons into 
popularity, the industry will not only be making significant current 
profits but will also be constitutionally guaranteeing future profits. 
This is particularly true since, as demonstrated in many of the cases 
above, courts often rely on mere manufacturing data in determining 
common use rather than sales data, which is more difficult to 
ascertain. Thus, manufacturers can contribute to a weapon’s 
constitutional protection simply by making a lot of them—whether 
or not they immediately become popular with consumers.   
The common use test also increases the power of legislators in 
more pro-gun states to control what becomes constitutionally 
protected. The use of a national common use test means that a 
weapon that becomes very popular in just a handful of populous 
states can become constitutionally protected in all of the states. 
Thus, while state governments may not have the federal 
government’s power to prevent arms from becoming protected under 
the common use test, a handful of pro-gun states with high enough 
populations could have the ability to bring a gun type into common 
use simply by allowing that type of gun to be sold even if most other 
states do not. There is no justification for giving states that favor 
less restrictive gun laws such unilateral power. 
State efforts to require safety improvements to firearms could 
also be stunted by the common use test. Although there are no 
federal design safety standards for firearms, several states have 
enacted laws setting such standards in order to promote safer 
designs—particularly of handguns—to prevent accidents.162 For 
example, California’s law requires semi-automatic handguns that 
were approved for sale in California after a certain date to include a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 162. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 16380, 16900, 17140, 31900–32110 (West 2012 & 
Supp. 2015); D.C. CODE § 7-2505.04 (2001); HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-15(a) (1993); 720 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24-3(A)(h) (West Supp. 2015); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY, 
§§ 5-405–406 (LexisNexis 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, §§ 123, 131½, 131¾ 
(West 2002 & Supp. 2015); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 624.712, 624.716 (West 2009 & 
Supp. 2015); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(12-a) (McKinney Supp. 2015); CAL. CODE 
REGS. tit. 11, §§ 4047–4074 (2011); D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 24, § 2323 (2013); 501 MASS. 
CODE REGS. §§ 7.01–.16 (2007); 940 MASS. CODE REGS. §§ 16.01–.09 (1999); N.Y. 
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, §§ 482.1–.7 (1980). 
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“chamber load indicator,”163 which is a device that provides a clear 
indication on a gun when a round is in the firing chamber.164 A more 
ambitious law in New Jersey will require all handguns that are sold 
after a certain date to be equipped with “smart gun” or “owner 
authorization” technology that allows the gun only to be fired by its 
authorized owner, once such technology is available.165   
The purpose of these laws is to drive changes in existing firearm 
models. In order to do that, these laws necessarily prohibit (or cause 
to be phased out over time) the sale of firearms that do not comply 
with these safety standards. In doing so, the laws may ban the sale 
of firearms that are currently in common use because many people 
in the nation will still possess firearms without the features 
promoted by the laws. This concern is not hypothetical; at least one 
lawsuit predicated on this exact argument is currently challenging 
California’s handgun safety standards.166   
Whether implementing certain safety standards for firearms 
somehow diminishes citizens’ ability to defend themselves is 
debatable, but that debate is not the one the common use test will 
require. Instead, the test simply asks whether the law bans firearms 
that are currently most commonly possessed, a test that laws setting 
new safety standards are, by definition, likely to fail.167 After all, if 
guns with a particular safety feature were already the norm, there 
would be much less of a need for regulatory intervention.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 163. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 31910(b)(4) (West 2012). 
 164. See SPORTING ARMS AND AMMUNITION MFRS.’ INST., Owner Recognition 
Technology, in BACKGROUND PAPER #9, 1, 3–4, http://www.saami.org/specifications_ 
and_information/publications/download/SAAMI_ITEM_229-
Owner_Recognition_Technology.pdf (last visited Dec. 26, 2015).  
 165. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:39-1dd, 2C:58-2a(5)(e), -2.3, -2.4; (West 2005 & 
Sup. 2015). 
 166. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum Of Points And Authorities In Support Of 
Plaintiffs’ Motion For Summary Judgment at 14, 19–20, Pena v. Lindley, No. 2:09-cv-
01185, 2015 WL 854684 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2015) (arguing that California’s handgun 
safety standards result in a ban on the sale of “handguns of the kind in common use 
protected by the Second Amendment.”). 
 167. Of course, that is not to say that challenges to these laws are necessarily 
guaranteed to succeed. Depending on the level of generality one uses to define 
firearms in common use, it may be that such laws do not ban firearms in common 
use after all (i.e., it does not matter whether handguns with feature X are common; it 
only matters that handguns generally are common, and since handguns are allowed 
under the laws, even if they must have feature X, the law does not ban a weapon in 
common use). Moreover, even if a court does find that the banned firearms are in 
common use, such laws could still survive at the second step of the analysis by 
satisfying the appropriate level of scrutiny.  
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3. The Public Choice Fallacy 
One of the alleged virtues of the common use test is that it 
supposedly reflects consumer choice and thus allows Americans, as a 
whole, to exercise the Second Amendment right in the way they 
decide is best.168 Superficially, this is an advantage the common use 
test shares with the test the Court established in Kyllo v. United 
States169 for determining whether the government’s use of a 
particular technology constituted a search by looking at whether the 
technology the government used was in general public use.170 
However, the advantage is lessened by the difference between the 
two rights. The Fourth Amendment’s underlying concern is privacy, 
while the Second Amendment’s underlying concern is physical 
safety. Unlike physical safety, privacy is a concept that is directly 
tied to the popular mores of the day.171 Thus, while a test based on 
the popularity of a particular technology might make sense in the 
Fourth Amendment context, it is less appropriate in the Second 
Amendment context.     
However, even taking the goal of reflecting public sentiment at 
face value, the common use test fails to accomplish this goal. For the 
reasons stated above, governments and firearm manufacturers 
actually have at least as much, if not more control than average 
Americans over which weapons end up in common use. But even 
setting those concerns aside, the common use test, at least as it has 
been applied by the courts so far, fails to actually reflect the self-
defense choices of most Americans. 
The problem is, as demonstrated in the cases above, in 
determining common use, courts tend to rely on the raw number of 
weapons that are in private hands without putting those numbers 
                                                                                                                 
 
 168. See Jensen-Haxel, supra note 147, at 471 (“[I]ndividual autonomy, as with 
many fundamental rights, may be an important consideration in defining the scope 
of protection.”); Michael P. O’Shea, The Right to Defensive Arms After District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 349, 386 (2009) (“That hundreds of 
thousands, indeed millions of individuals choose a particular means of participating 
in constitutionally protected conduct is powerful prima facie evidence that the chosen 
means is itself deserving of protection. In other constitutional contexts, wide 
deference is given to individuals’ chosen means for exercising a constitutional right—
even if most judges and other elites might find the people’s choice as unseemly and 
ill-adapted as, say, the decision to engage in political protest by wearing a jacket that 
reads ‘Fuck the Draft.’”). 
 169. 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (Scalia, J.). 
 170. See id. at 40. 
 171. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) 
(“New technology may provide increased convenience or security at the expense of 
privacy, and many people may find the tradeoff worthwhile.”). 
2015] SECOND AMENDMENT “TYPE OF WEAPON” ANALYSIS 41 
 
into any context. But context is quite important. For example, in 
analyzing assault weapons bans, some courts have highlighted the 
fact that several million AR-15 type rifles have been manufactured 
over the last few decades.172 Even assuming that manufacturing 
statistics necessarily reflect ownership173 and that several million is 
enough to constitute common use, this statistic still fails to 
demonstrate that AR-15 type rifles are really commonly chosen for 
self-defense. That is because this statistic fails to account for the fact 
that some people, probably a great number, own more than one AR-
15 style rifle.174 Thus, these statistics do not reflect any widespread 
popularity of the AR-15 style rifle, but rather reflect these weapons’ 
popularity with a relatively small number of people building 
personal arsenals.175 
This is a problem that is likely to arise with respect to many 
categories of firearms because gun ownership is becoming more 
concentrated in the United States.176 One 2004 study found that 20% 
of the nation’s gun owners own 65% of the nation’s guns.177 It is 
likely that this concentration has only increased since then as more 
recent surveys have found a drop in the percentage of Americans 
who say they own any guns178 despite record numbers of background 
checks being processed by the federal government.179   
This concentrated ownership gives courts a skewed picture of 
which guns are in common use. By simply looking at raw numbers, 
courts will extend the Second Amendment’s protection to new 
                                                                                                                 
 
 172. See discussion of NYSRPA and Heller II, supra Section IV.A. 
 173. A potentially dubious assumption for the reasons discussed in the next 
subsection. 
 174. See Kolbe v. O’Malley, F. Supp. 3d 768, 786 & n.23 (D. Md. 2014) (citing 
declaration testimony indicating that the average owner of an AR or AK platform 
rifle owns 3.1 such weapons). 
 175. See id. 
 176. See, e.g., id.  
 177. See Allison Brennan, Analysis: Fewer U.S. Gun Owners Own More Guns, 
CNN (July 31, 2012, 8:05 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/31/politics/gun-
ownership-declining/.  
 178. This also highlights a potential under-protection problem. If the decline in 
gun ownership rates continues, even if the remaining gun owners own many guns, 
there could come a point at which no guns are in common use. At that point, under 
the common use test, the government would theoretically be able to ban all guns. 
 179. See Sabrina Tavernise & Robert Gebeloff, Share of Homes with Guns Shows 
4-Decade Decline, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/10/us/ 
rate-of-gun-ownership-is-down-survey-shows.html (noting that according to a 2012 
survey, only 34% of Americans reported having a gun in their home, a historic low, 
but also noting that the number of background checks has “surged” since the late 
1990s). 
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weapons based on the preferences of a shrinking number of gun 
enthusiasts. This greatly diminishes the common use test’s supposed 
value as a reflection of Americans’—or even gun owners’—collective 
self-defense preferences.   
4.  The Data Problem 
A practical problem with the common use test is that the data on 
firearm ownership necessary to evaluate whether the test is satisfied 
in any given case simply does not exist. The United States has no 
national registry recording firearm ownership, nor do most states 
have such registries.180 For that reason, courts have been forced to 
rely on secondary indicators of firearm ownership, most commonly 
production and import data, sales data, and survey data.181 Each of 
these sources is inadequate and potentially problematic. 
Production and import data presents the obvious problem that it 
does not necessarily reflect which guns were actually sold. Of course, 
a smart company is unlikely to continue manufacturing or importing 
a type of gun that is not selling well, but an adjustment in 
manufacturing or imports would likely be a lagging indicator of any 
decline or rise in the popularity of a weapon among consumers. A 
related problem is that manufacturing and import data will reflect 
what companies think consumers want to buy now or perhaps in the 
next few months or years, not what they already own. This will lead 
courts to overestimate the popularity of more “contemporary” guns 
while underestimating the popularity of guns that may indeed be 
widely owned but were bought a long time ago and are not widely in 
demand today. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 180. See Registration of Firearms Policy Summary, LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN 
VIOLENCE (Oct. 1, 2013), http://smartgunlaws.org/registration-of-firearms-policy-
summary/ (noting that only Hawaii and the District of Columbia require the 
registration of all firearms). The federal government does require the registration of 
machine guns. Id. A few states maintain records of some firearm transfers that could 
be used as a basis to estimate ownership, but since those records are primarily kept 
for the purpose of tracking the transfers rather than ownership, they would likely be 
of limited utility. See Kolbe, 42 F. Supp. 3d at 784 n.21 (“Since 1994, Maryland has 
gathered information regarding the transfer of regulated firearms. It is important to 
note, however, that all transfers were recorded, even if the transfer was of a firearm 
previously transferred. . . . In this way, the information collected by Maryland may 
overstate the number of regulated firearms.”) (citations omitted).   
 181. See, e.g., Heller v. D.C. (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
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More fundamentally, manufacturing data is unlikely to provide 
enough specific information to be of use to courts because “firearms 
manufacturers generally don’t break down their production statistics 
by model.”182 Perhaps for competitive reasons, gun manufacturers 
simply do not publicly release data at the fine level of detail that 
would be necessary to draw conclusions in cases challenging laws 
that target very specific firearm characteristics. For this reason, 
manufacturing data (and probably import data) will seldom be of 
much use in applying the common use test. 
Sales data also is not likely to be a good barometer of common 
use. Like manufacturing data, it suffers from the problem of only 
reflecting consumers’ current choices, rather than the types of guns 
consumers may have purchased many years ago. Sales data is also 
elusive because information submitted to the federal government to 
obtain background checks does not include any information on the 
specific type of firearm the purchaser attempted to buy.183 Moreover, 
even if such records were kept in connection with background 
checks, a significant portion of firearm transfers are conducted 
without background checks at all through so-called “private” 
transfers (transfers that do not involve a federally licensed firearms 
dealer).184 When it comes to the sale of ammunition and other 
accessories, no background checks are conducted at all in most 
states.   
                                                                                                                 
 
 182. See Peters, supra note 22. 
 183. See 28 C.F.R. § 25.9(b)(1) (2009) (listing the types of information logged for 
each criminal background check conducted). Even the data that is collected in order 
to conduct these checks must be erased within twenty-four hours if the purchase is 
approved. See 28 C.F.R. § 25.9(b)(1)(iii) (2009). However, the federal government 
does keep data on the raw number of background checks conducted by state and by 
date. See FBI, NATIONAL INSTANT CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECK SYSTEM (NICS) 
Operations 2013 (2013), https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/nics/reports/2013-
operations-report.  
 184. See Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Guns in America: National Survey on 
Private Ownership and Use of Firearms, NAT’L INST. OF JUST.: RES. IN BRIEF 6–7 
(1997), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/165476.pdf. The exact percentage 
of transfers conducted without background checks has been the subject of some 
dispute in recent years in the debate over whether to expand the background check 
requirement to private transfers. See Glenn Kessler, Obama’s continued use of the 
claim that 40 percent of gun sales lack background checks, WASH. POST: FACT 
CHECKER (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/ 
obamas-continued-use-of-the-claim-that-40-percent-of-gun-sales-lack-background-
checks/2013/04/01/002e06ce-9b0f-11e2-a941-a19bce7af755_blog.html. However, the 
basic point for my purposes, whether the number is as high as 40% or as low as 10%, 
is that such checks do not cover some sizeable portion of firearm transfers in the 
United States.  
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For these reasons, the only sales data available is the data that 
is voluntarily released by firearms retailers. Such data is likely to be 
lacking both in its level of detail about the specific weapon types 
purchased and in completeness because of the large number of 
firearms dealers in the United States.185 Thus, sales data is also 
unlikely to be helpful in applying the common use test. 
Perhaps the best form of data available to approximate firearm 
ownership is survey data. However, even survey data is unlikely to 
be sufficient for purposes of the common use test because most 
polling questions about gun ownership are much broader than would 
be helpful. Polls usually track questions like whether anyone in the 
household owns “a gun” generally, without asking about the type.186 
This type of information may be helpful in determining the size of 
the total pool of gun owners to the extent that is relevant, but it is 
unlikely to help courts get very far when it comes to determining 
whether weapons with very specific features are in common use. 
Although one could argue that the existence of the common use 
test will lead to the creation of more robust data in the future, that 
is unlikely to occur because data on firearms sales and ownership is 
deliberately cloaked in secrecy by the firearms industry and pro-gun 
groups. Unlike many other industries, trade groups representing the 
firearm industry do not release sales data as a regular practice.187 
Moreover, pro-gun groups have actively—and successfully—lobbied 
against any efforts by the federal government to gather data on 
firearm sales through its background check system or other 
means.188 Similarly, the gun lobby has successfully suppressed 
                                                                                                                 
 
 185. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS, & 
EXPLOSIVES, REPORT OF ACTIVE FIREARMS LICENSES—LICENSE TYPE BY STATE 
STATISTICS 2 (July 10, 2014) (showing just over 140,000 federally licensed firearms 
sellers), available at https://www.atf.gov/file/17071/download. 
 186. See, e.g., Washington Post-ABC News poll April 11–14, 2013, WASH. POST, 
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/politics/washington-post-abc-news-poll-april-
11-14-2013/105/ (asking whether “you or anyone in your house own a gun or not?”) 
(last visited Dec. 26, 2015). 
 187. See Josh Horwitz, When It Comes to Data on Firearm Sales, Gun Lobby Still 
Shooting Blanks, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 6, 2012, 7:20 AM), http://www.huffingtonp
ost.com/josh-horwitz/when-it-comes-to-data-on_b_1256769.html (noting that while 
“[v]irtually every other industry in America offers the media actual data on sales[,]” 
the firearm industry does not). 
 188. See 28 C.F.R. § 25.9(b)(3) (2014) (forbidding the FBI or any other 
government agency from using background check data “to establish any system for 
the registration of firearms, firearm owners, or firearm transactions or dispositions 
. . . .”); Robert Draper, Inside the Power of the N.R.A., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/15/magazine/inside-the-power-of-the-nra.html (“[A] 
chief talking point of the gun lobby was that universal background checks might 
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federal funding for research on firearms, which will make it less 
likely that more rigorous, detailed studies will be done on gun 
ownership patterns.189 Thus, it is unlikely that, even with the 
common use test in place, a new source of data will emerge to help 
courts evaluate whether particular weapons pass that test.190  
                                                                                                                 
 
enable a government agency to compile a national registry . . . .”); Amanda Terkel, 
Federal Gun Registry Is The New Death Panels, HUFFINGTON POST, (Apr. 17, 2013, 
1:21 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/17/federal-gun-
registry_n_3101204.html (“In the days leading up to Wednesday’s Senate vote on gun 
legislation amendments, the talking point that has taken off most amongst 
conservatives as a reason to oppose the background check compromise is that it 
would lead to a national database of gun owners.”); see also James W. Porter II, 
Registered Firearms Today; Confiscated Firearms Tomorrow, NAT’L RIFLE ASS’N 
INST. FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.nraila.org/news-
issues/articles/2014/4/registered-firearms-today-confiscated-firearms-tomorrow.aspx 
(arguing that any system of registration will lead to “confiscation” of firearms).  
 189. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-74, §§ 218, 12 
Stat. 786, 1085 (2011), 125 Stat 786, 1085 (“None of the funds made available [to the 
Department of Health & Human Services] may be used, in whole or in part, to 
advocate or promote gun control.”); Michael de Leeuw, Let Us Talk Past Each Other 
for a While: A Brief Response to Professor Johnson, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1637, 1647 
(2013) (noting that after the quoted appropriations language was first adopted in 
1996, “[r]ightly (or wrongly) the CDC took this admonition seriously and essentially 
stopped all research into firearms-related health issues.”); Michael Luo, N.R.A. 
Stymies Firearms Research, Scientists Say, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 25, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/26/us/26guns.html (“The amount of money available 
today for studying the impact of firearms is a fraction of what it was in the mid-
1990s, and the number of scientists toiling in the field has dwindled to just a handful 
as a result, researchers say.”). Moreover, pro-gun groups’ suspicion of attempts to 
gather data on firearm ownership may lead to lower response rates on any surveys 
that are attempted to measure firearm ownership in more detail. 
 190. The only other potential source of firearms data is “gun tracing” conducted 
by the FBI for local law enforcement in connection with criminal investigations. Gun 
tracing tracks a particular weapon to its point of sale and does require recording the 
exact type of firearm involved. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, 
TOBACCO, FIREARMS, & EXPLOSIVES, FIREARMS TRACE DATA: ALABAMA 2 (2012), 
https://www.atf.gov/sites/default/files/assets/statistics/tracedata-2012/2012-trace-
data-alabama.pdf. However, that data has important limitations, including the fact 
that the FBI only conducts traces on guns where it is requested by local law 
enforcement agencies, therefore making the sample contained in the trace data not 
random. See id. More fundamentally, trace data reflects the type of guns used in (or 
suspected of being used in) crimes, whereas the common use test is concerned with 
guns that are owned for lawful purposes. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. 
Cuomo (NYSRPA), 990 F. Supp. 2d 349, 364–65 (W.D.N.Y. 2013). 
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5.  The Doctrinal Problem 
The above problems could be dismissed as mere disagreements 
with the policy results of the test if the test were somehow required 
by the constitutional text. After all, a constitutional mandate’s 
failure to work in practice should not give courts license to ignore it. 
Even if the test were merely required by long-standing precedent, 
that would at least provide some reason for trepidation in suddenly 
going in a different direction. However, the common use test is not 
mandated by the Constitution or precedent at all and is in fact 
inconsistent with the other (more important) parts of Heller. 
The Second Amendment’s text obviously contains no explicit 
limitation on the type of “arms” it protects.191 As the court found in 
Heller, it “extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute 
bearable arms . . . .”192 The Court, of course, would limit this broad 
scope with the common use test. But the source of that test is not 
purported to be the constitutional text, but rather the Court’s earlier 
decision in Miller.193   
However, the Court’s supposed reliance on Miller does not hold 
up to scrutiny. Miller does not apply the common use test at all. 
Instead, Miller found the short-barreled shotgun at issue 
unprotected by the Second Amendment because it was not “any part 
of the ordinary military equipment . . . [and] could [not] contribute to 
the common defense.”194 This is a test tied to that Court’s conception 
of the Second Amendment as having the “obvious purpose to assure 
the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of [militia] 
forces . . . .”195 Only after making that clear, does the Court mention 
“that ordinarily when called for service [men serving in the militia] 
were expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of 
the kind in common use at the time.”196 This one sentence hardly 
represents the creation of a common use test, particularly when the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 191. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 192. 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008). 
 193. See id. at 623–27; see also Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in 
First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 419 (2009) (“Although 
[extending the protection of the Second Amendment only to arms in common use] is 
probably in line with contemporary popular understanding of the Second 
Amendment, it is difficult to justify based on a categorical reading of the 
Amendment’s text or original understanding.”). 
 194. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (alteration in original). 
 195. Id. (“[The Second Amendment] must be interpreted and applied with that 
end in view.”). 
 196. Id. at 179. 
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Court applied a completely different test in actually determining the 
outcome of the case. 
Moreover, in other aspects of its analysis, the Heller Court went 
to great lengths to criticize and undermine any precedential value 
Miller may have had. The Court noted that “[i]t is particularly 
wrongheaded to read Miller for more than what it said, because the 
case did not even purport to be a thorough examination of the 
Second Amendment.”197 The Court explained that Miller was decided 
under strange circumstances because the defendants made no 
appearance in the case, so the Court only heard from the 
government.198 This fact alone was “reason enough,” for the Court in 
Heller, “not to make [Miller] the beginning and the end of this 
Court's consideration of the Second Amendment[].”199 The Court also 
criticized Miller as a source of the meaning of the Second 
Amendment because it contained “[n]ot a word (not a word) about 
the history of the Second Amendment.”200 
In light of the Court’s finding that Miller was completely 
unworthy of reliance in determining the central question in Heller, it 
makes no sense to twist Miller’s language in knots to divine the 
meaning of the term “arms” in the Second Amendment. Whether the 
Court wanted to explicitly admit it or not, Miller was relying on a 
collective understanding of the Second Amendment that the Heller 
Court was abandoning. Therefore, there was no need or reason for 
the Court to have relied on Miller in determining any part of the 
scope of the new individual right it was recognizing.201 
                                                                                                                 
 
 197. Heller, 554 U.S. at 623. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 624. 
 201. See Peruta v. Cnty. of San Diego, 742 F.3d 1144, 1155–56 (9th Cir. 2014), 
vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 781 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted) 
(“[S]ome cases are more equal than others. That’s because, with Heller on the books, 
the Second Amendment’s original meaning is now settled in at least two relevant 
respects. First, Heller clarifies that the keeping and bearing of arms is, and has 
always been, an individual right. Second, the right is, and has always been, oriented 
to the end of self-defense. Any contrary interpretation of the right, whether 
propounded in 1791 or just last week, is error. What that means for our review is 
that historical interpretations of the right’s scope are of varying probative worth, 
falling generally into one of three categories ranked here in descending order: (1) 
authorities that understand bearing arms for self-defense to be an individual right, 
(2) authorities that understand bearing arms for a purpose other than self-defense to 
be an individual right, and (3) authorities that understand bearing arms not to be an 
individual right at all.”); see also Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the 
Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 259 (1983) 
(“[T]he ‘ordinary military equipment’ criterion is infected by Miller’s conceptually 
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The common use test is also in some tension with the asserted 
central purpose of the right to keep and bear arms identified by 
Heller. The Court repeatedly described the right (or at least its core 
component) as the “the inherent right of self-defense . . . .”202 
However, the common use test has nothing whatsoever to do with 
self-defense. Its origin is in the way people served in militias at the 
time of the founding, while its application in the modern context 
focuses on market share. While both of these things might be 
tangentially related to self-defense,203 neither is directly tied to 
modern self-defense in any meaningful way. A gun can become 
popular for reasons that have nothing to do with its usefulness for 
self-defense, such as cost, heavy marketing, or usefulness for some 
other purpose (i.e., sports shooting). Conversely, a gun (or other 
weapon) that is unpopular may nevertheless be highly useful for 
self-defense. The test for determining what arms are protected 
should not be so divorced from the right’s central self-defensive 
purpose.   
B.  Proposed Alternatives to The Common Use Test 
I am not the first to criticize the common-use test, and a few 
alternative approaches have been suggested. However, each of these 
alternatives204 suffers from its own deficiencies that make it an 
unsatisfying choice to replace the common-use test. One test would 
ask whether a particular firearm is a “descendant” of a firearm that 
                                                                                                                 
 
flawed concentration on the amendment’s militia purpose, to the exclusion of its 
other objectives.”). 
 202. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628; see, e.g., id. at 599, 606, 616 (“The prefatory clause 
does not suggest that preserving the militia was the only reason Americans valued 
the ancient right; most undoubtedly thought it even more important for self-defense 
and hunting. . . . [Although] self-defense had little to do with the right’s codification; 
it was the central component of the right itself. . . . Tucker elaborated on the Second 
Amendment: ‘This may be considered as the true palladium of liberty . . . . The right 
to self defence is the first law of nature: in most governments it has been the study of 
rulers to confine the right within the narrowest limits possible. . . . It was plainly the 
understanding in the post–Civil War Congress that the Second Amendment 
protected an individual right to use arms for self-defense.”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  
 203. The weapons used in the militia at the time of the founding were probably 
similar to weapons used for self-defense, and today’s consumer preferences in 
firearms probably in some ways reflect self-defense preferences. 
 204. This does not purport to be an exhaustive list of all ideas that have been 
suggested, but the ideas described in this section represent some of the major themes 
that have been proposed. 
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was in common use at the time of the founding.205 A second proposal 
would tie protection of firearms to law enforcement’s firearm 
choices.206 A third would ask whether a given weapon is materially 
more dangerous than the handguns at issue in Heller.207 
1.  The Lineal Descendant Test 
The lineal descendant test was proposed by some scholars prior 
to Heller and at least implicitly embraced by the D.C. Circuit in the 
opinion that was reviewed in Heller.208 Although there are several 
variants of it, this approach, either in addition to or instead of the 
common-use test, asks whether the weapon at issue is one that is 
“lineally descended from the kinds of weaponry known to the 
Founders.”209 While this approach has the virtue of some link to 
history, it would create more problems than it would solve. 
The lineal descendent test is unlikely to be a good solution 
because it is unworkable and just as disconnected from the central 
purpose of the Second Amendment right as the common use test.210 
The practical difficulty lies in determining which guns are in fact 
“descendants” of founding era weapons. In some sense, every modern 
firearm is descended from some earlier weapon because of the 
inherently iterative nature of all technological development. The test 
must necessarily be narrower than that. But what aspect of a 
firearm makes it a descendant? The D.C. Circuit seemed to think 
today’s semi-automatic handguns are lineal descendants of colonial 
era muskets.211 But would a 3D printed handgun that is otherwise 
identical to other modern handguns similarly be considered a 
descendant? Do large capacity ammunition magazines count as 
lineal descendants because firearms at the time of the founding also 
had some amount of bullets? If so, would that mean that any 
capacity magazine (i.e., a 100 round magazine) would necessarily be 
a lineal descendant? These questions are extremely difficult to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 205. See Kates, supra note 201, at 259. 
 206. See Lerner & Lund, supra note 153, at 1411–12. 
 207. See Volokh, supra note 24, at 1481–83. 
 208. See Parker v. D.C., 478 F.3d 370, 398 (2007); Jerry Bonanno, Comment, 
Facing the Lion in the Bush: Exploring the Implications of Adopting an Individual 
Rights Interpretation of the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution, 29 
HAMLINE. L. REV. 463, 484 (2006); Kates, supra note 201, at 259.  
 209. See Kates, supra note 201, at 259. 
 210. To the extent this test is simply added to the common use test (i.e., by 
requiring that a weapon be lineally descended in addition to being in common use) it 
retains many of the problems the common use test has on its own, discussed supra.  
 211. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 398. 
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answer and would likely devolve into an arbitrary line drawing 
exercise.212 
More problematically, this test suffers from the same problem 
that the common use test does in that it disconnects the scope of the 
word “arms” from the self-defensive purpose of the right. Whether a 
particular weapon is a lineal descendant of a weapon in use at the 
time of the founding (however courts would ultimately end up 
applying that test), has little relationship to whether that weapon 
would be helpful for modern self-defense. Consider, for example, the 
taser. Tasers generally work by shooting “two small, needle-like 
tethered probes 135-160 feet-per-second into the skin or clothing of a 
target using compressed nitrogen. The probes instantly emit a 
pulsating, electrical charge on contact that lasts an uninterrupted 
five to seven seconds[]” in order to (non-lethally) subdue the 
target.213 It would be hard to argue that tasers are descended from 
any kind of weapon that would be familiar to the founders, and yet, 
they can be highly useful to modern people for self-defense—perhaps 
even more so than a handgun.214 The lineal descendant test simply 
replaces the common use test’s misplaced focus on popularity with a 
misplaced inquiry into firearms history that remains disconnected 
from the Second Amendment right’s central purpose. 
2.  The Law Enforcement Test 
Another intriguing test suggested in the scholarship is to tie 
which weapons are protected by the Second Amendment to those 
that are commonly used by law enforcement.215 Different proposals 
                                                                                                                 
 
 212. See John Zulkey, Note, The Obsolete Second Amendment: How Advances in 
Arms Technology Have Made the Prefatory Clause Incompatible with Public Policy, 
U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 213, 232, 232 n.138 (2010) (“Given that technology does 
not have clear-cut predecessors and family lines the way humans and animals do, 
there is no objective test to determine which weapons are or are not the lineal 
descendants of revolutionary-era weapons.”); see also Volokh, supra note 24, at 1477 
(“The trouble with [a lineal descendants test] is that all civilian firearms are in some 
ways both modifications of military firearms and technological advancements on past 
civilian firearms.”). 
 213. Wright, supra note 127, at 163–64. 
 214. See id. at 181–89 (arguing that tasers are particularly useful for self-
defense because of the lessened likelihood compared with firearms that they will be 
used to injure the user or injure someone else unlawfully); see also Lerner & Lund, 
supra note 153, at 1398 (“Judged by ease of use and minimization of harm, pepper 
spray and Tasers are generally superior to traditional lethal weapons, such as 
handguns and shotguns.”). 
 215. See Lerner & Lund, supra note 153, at 1411–12; O’Shea, supra note 168, at 
391–92.  
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have incorporated this concept differently into various tests;216 but 
the basic idea is that if a weapon is commonly issued to police to 
carry out law enforcement functions, then that is strong evidence 
that it qualifies for protection under the Second Amendment. 
Proponents of this test argue, probably correctly, that it would solve 
the under-protection problem because governments are unlikely to 
bar their police from adopting new useful self-defense weapons even 
if governments might be inclined to ban civilian possession of those 
weapons.217 However, the test would create numerous other 
problems. 
The main issue is that police and civilians are not at all similarly 
situated with respect to self-defense. Unlike civilians, police are 
highly trained in how to operate their firearms under particularly 
stressful circumstances.218 Also unlike civilians, police, by the nature 
of their job, may put themselves into dangerous combat-like 
situations and may also make themselves targets for heavily armed 
criminals. For these reasons, it may be more appropriate for police 
officers to carry deadlier weapons than would likely be necessary for 
civilian self-defense needs. 
Moreover, rendering police unable to possess better weapons 
than those available to the general population would encourage an 
                                                                                                                 
 
 216. Professor O’Shea’s proposal calls for looking to both the popularity of a 
weapon among the general public (i.e., the common use test) and to the popularity of 
a weapon among police departments. O’Shea, supra note 168, at 391–92. Professors 
Lerner & Lund would have the courts “adopt a presumption that civilians may 
employ self-defense technologies in widespread use by the police,” which would be 
“rebuttable by sufficiently strong evidence that a particular device is suitable for 
police work but not for civilian use.” Lerner & Lund, supra note 153, at 1411–12.  
 217. See O’Shea, supra note 168, at 391. 
 218. See Kolbe v. O’Malley, 42 F. Supp. 3d 768, 798–99 (D. Md. 2014) (citations 
omitted) (“In Maryland, law enforcement officers who wish to carry firearms must 
successfully complete the applicable firearms classroom instruction, training, and 
qualification. They must then submit to firearms training every year thereafter. If 
the officers do not submit to the required annual training, their firearms are seized 
until the training is completed. In addition to receiving extensive training on the use 
of firearms generally, law enforcement officers must receive further specialized 
training to use assault weapons. They are taught how and when assault weapons 
may be used, as well as techniques to minimize the risk of harm to innocent civilians. 
Even after they have received this training, they must undergo periodic 
requalification to continue carrying assault weapons in the line of duty. Retired law 
enforcement officers have also received training on the use of LCMs; in particular, 
they have been taught how to assess each shot for effectiveness and how to evaluate 
the circumstances before continuing to fire additional rounds. Finally, they have 
received judgment training on the use of deadly force and how to safely handle and 
store firearms, including in their homes.”). 
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arms race between police and criminals. If every time the police get 
a new sophisticated weapon, that weapon must be made available to 
the public, then criminals will also gain access to that weapon, 
leaving the police to look for a still more advanced weapon to regain 
the upper hand. This cycle unfortunately already goes on to some 
extent as it is, and there is no reason to create a test for Second 
Amendment analysis that would further encourage it.219       
3.  The Handgun Dangerousness Test 
One approach that has been suggested—and the one that is most 
similar to my own proposal—asks whether the weapon at issue is 
materially more dangerous than a handgun or other weapon already 
in common use.220 The idea is because weapons in common use, such 
as handguns, were already approved by Heller, then any weapons 
that are of equivalent or lesser dangerousness than those guns 
should be allowed.221 Conversely, any weapons that are more 
dangerous than those already approved in Heller should be 
unprotected because the exemplar weapons Heller listed as 
unprotected (machine guns and sawed-off shot guns) are more 
dangerous than handguns in common use.222 
This test makes sense to a certain degree; it would have the 
positive effect of bringing some of the attention back to the weapons 
themselves and their dangerousness instead of ancillary concerns 
like market share and each weapon’s history. However, its main 
problem is that it does not completely walk away from the concept of 
common use, which still leaves intact many of the problems 
discussed above.   
Additionally, the test’s singular focus on dangerousness probably 
would create some issues. For example, a weapon may be developed 
(or may already exist) that is more dangerous than a handgun but 
more useful for self-defense. Under this test, because the weapon is 
                                                                                                                 
 
 219. It might be argued by some that putting the police and civilians on equal 
footing is exactly what the Second Amendment was intended to do (i.e., to create a 
bulwark against tyranny). See, e.g., David Pittman, Note, Heller: A Bulwark Against 
Tyranny, 8 APPALACHIAN J.L. 201, 202 (2009). However, this purpose of the Second 
Amendment right was not endorsed by Heller, with the Court acknowledging that “it 
may be true that no amount of small arms could be useful against modern-day 
bombers and tanks.” See D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008). 
 220. See Michael S. Obermeier, Comment, Scoping Out the Limits of “Arms” 
Under the Second Amendment, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 681, 718–20 (2012); Volokh, supra, 
note 24, at 1481–83. 
 221. See Volokh, supra note 24, at 1481–82. 
 222. See id. 
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considered more dangerous than a handgun, it presumably could be 
banned without examining its self-defensive utility. Or, on the other 
side of the coin, this approach would not allow much room for safety 
regulations on handguns because it begins with the assumption that 
the handguns that were in use at the time Heller was decided, or 
anything else equivalently dangerous, are untouchable. This would 
be true even if the safety regulations at issue did nothing to interfere 
with the utility of handguns.   
Dangerousness is a particularly nebulous concept in the area of 
weapons. Every weapon is—by design—dangerous. And often, the 
more dangerous a weapon is, the more effective it is for self-
defense.223 A better rule would go deeper than asking about 
dangerousness alone and instead ask why a particular weapon is 
dangerous.224  
C.  The Reasonable Self-Defense Approach 
To determine whether a weapon is protected by the Second 
Amendment, courts should be guided by a test that is directly tied to 
that right’s purpose of self-defense. Accordingly, I propose the 
following test: Is the weapon at issue a reasonable choice for lawful, 
armed self-defense? A court could consider the totality of the 
circumstances in determining reasonableness, including:  
A weapon’s usefulness for self-defense. How well does the 
weapon stop attackers? Can a person under duress easily use the 
weapon?  
The weapon’s dangerousness to the user or innocent bystanders. 
Does the weapon have a record of malfunctioning? Can it be easily 
accessed and used by children? Does the type of ammunition 
involved have more destructive power than necessary for self-
defensive purposes? 
The weapon’s propensity to be used in mass shootings. Does the 
weapon allow the shooter to fire many rounds very quickly with 
minimal recoil?    
                                                                                                                 
 
 223. See N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Cuomo (NYSRPA), 990 F. Supp. 2d 
349, 368 (W.D.N.Y. 2013) (“There thus can be no serious dispute that the very 
features that increase a weapons’ utility for self-defense also increase its 
dangerousness to the public at large.”). 
 224. Michael Obermeier, in his insightful comment on this issue, recognized as 
much by pairing his proposed dangerousness comparison to handguns with asking 
whether “the innate characteristics of the weapon . . . generally favor legitimate 
purposes, such as self-defense or hunting, over criminal ones.” See Obermeier, supra 
note 220, at 684.  
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A weapon’s propensity or potential to be used for other unlawful 
purposes. Weapons like entirely plastic guns designed to avoid metal 
detectors or guns with the serial numbers removed225 could be 
examples of weapons with such a potential. 
All of these factors would be judged in the context of the universe 
of weapons that remain available in light of the law at issue (i.e., the 
available alternatives). These are not necessarily a complete list of 
the factors courts could rely on in determining reasonableness,226 but 
the basic point would always be to protect those weapons that allow 
users to defend themselves227 well with minimal risk to themselves 
and the community at large.   
The main advantage of this approach over the common use test 
and other suggested tests is that it is directly tied to the purpose of 
the right. Under this test, in any type of weapon case, the focus both 
of the arguments between the parties, and the court’s ultimate 
decision would be squarely on what the weapon involved actually 
does. In a case challenging an assault weapons ban, the court would 
consider whether a weapon with the characteristics prohibited by 
the statute is a reasonable choice for self-defense, rather than 
searching in vain for market share statistics. In a case challenging 
consumer safety requirements for handguns, a court would consider 
whether guns without the required safety features are reasonable 
                                                                                                                 
 
 225. Cf. United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 98 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Firearms 
without serial numbers are of particular value to those engaged in illicit activity 
because the absence of serial numbers helps shield recovered firearms and their 
possessors from identification.”). 
 226. Litigants could also have the opportunity to convince courts to consider the 
geographical scope of a particular ban in determining reasonableness. For example, a 
city defending a city-wide ban on a particular type of arm could argue that the 
weapon is not a reasonable choice for self-defense in a densely populated city, or a 
plaintiff challenging a ban on a particular weapon type in a more rural area could 
argue that a higher degree of firepower is necessary where police response times may 
be higher. In either case though, geography would likely be of little weight compared 
to the intrinsic characteristics of the weapon and how those characteristics bear on 
the weapon’s capacity for self-defense because confrontations requiring self-defense 
probably are not extremely dissimilar even in different places.  
 227. Or perhaps, engage in other lawful firearm related activities such as 
hunting. Although the Court described the central component of the right as the 
right to self-defense, it left open the possibility that other uses of firearms could be 
protected. See D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008) (“The prefatory clause does not 
suggest that preserving the militia was the only reason Americans valued the 
ancient right; most undoubtedly thought it even more important for self-defense and 
hunting.”). My proposal would apply equally in the event such a right to use arms for 
hunting is recognized, with the question slightly modified to whether the weapon at 
issue is a reasonable choice for lawful hunting purposes. 
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self-defense choices, rather than grappling with what level of 
generality defines a “handgun.” Simply put, the reasonable self-
defense test allows litigants to have an argument about what 
actually matters: the relationship between the weapons and self-
defense. 
Another advantage is that this test would be much easier for 
courts to apply than the common use test. Unlike the common use 
test’s reliance on statistics of questionable value and availability, 
applying the self-defense test would require only looking at 
information that is readily available, either in the form of empirical 
data or expert testimony. In fact, courts have already been relying 
on this sort of information in purporting to conduct the second step 
of the analysis (selecting or applying the appropriate level of 
scrutiny) in type of weapons cases. As described above in Part IV, in 
Heller II, NYSRPA, and Fyock, the courts upheld bans on assault 
weapons and large capacity ammunition magazines based on factors 
including those weapons’ propensity for use in mass shootings,228 
their usefulness for self-defense,229 and the likelihood of the weapons 
injuring bystanders.230 Similarly, in James, where the court simply 
ignored the common use test, the court based its dangerousness 
analysis on similar kinds of evidence.231 The reasonable self-defense 
                                                                                                                 
 
 228. See, e.g., NYSRPA, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 369 (“Studies and data support New 
York’s view that assault weapons are often used to devastating effect in mass 
shootings.”); Heller v. D.C. (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(“[A]ssault weapons account for a larger share of guns used in mass murders and 
murders of police, crimes for which weapons with greater firepower would seem 
particularly useful[.]”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 229. See, e.g., Fyock v. City of Sunnyvale, 25 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1280 (N.D. Cal. 
2014) (finding a ban on large capacity ammunition magazines satisfies intermediate 
scrutiny in part because “studies of the NRA Institute for Legislative Action 
database demonstrate[e] that individuals acting in self-defense fire 2.1–2.2 shots on 
average.”). 
 230. See, e.g., Heller II, 670 F.3d at 1263–64 (“[H]igh capacity magazines are 
dangerous in self-defense situations because the tendency is for defenders to keep 
firing until all bullets have been expended, which poses grave risks to others in the 
household, passersby, and bystanders.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 231. See People v. James, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d 576, 585–86 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (“The 
.50 caliber BMG rifle has the capacity to destroy or seriously damage vital public and 
private buildings, civilian, police and military vehicles, power generation and 
transmission facilities, petrochemical production and storage facilities, and 
transportation infrastructure. These are not the types of weapons that are typically 
possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes such as sport hunting or self-
defense; rather these are weapons of war.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). In 
Kampfer v. Cuomo, although the court did not explicitly rely on any specific piece of 
evidence about the weapons at issue, it did rely on the fact that the weapons left 
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test would allow courts to be honest about what their methodology 
and use this evidence to assess whether the weapons should be 
protected at all. 
Courts are also very institutionally familiar with the concept of 
objective reasonableness as a standard. Courts already routinely ask 
whether officers had reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk a 
suspect,232 whether a person exercised reasonable care,233 or whether 
a reasonable person would believe a contract has been formed.234 In 
the context of self-defense in criminal law, courts already apply a 
proportionality analysis that asks whether the defendant used an 
amount of force that was “not excessive in relation to the threatened 
force” against him or her.235 Applying a similar reasonableness 
standard to firearms that asks whether the chosen firearm is 
excessive in relation to a more generalized conception of the threats 
people face would not be a large leap for courts to make. This is in 
stark contrast to the mostly unfamiliar concept of common use.       
Some may critique this proposal as allowing courts too much 
discretion in determining which weapons are protected.236 However, 
the common use test already allows at least as much discretion by 
allowing courts to define the level of generality at which a weapon’s 
commonality will be measured and by allowing courts to pick and 
choose between different points of largely suspect data in deciding 
how to measure common use. Moreover, the description of certain 
supposedly long-standing exceptions to Second Amendment 
protection recognized in Heller already represented some amount of 
subjective balancing, even if the Court did not admit it.237 
Essentially, almost any test will have a certain amount of 
subjectivity to it, so the test courts choose might as well be one that 
is actually connected to the right Heller recognized and one that will 
                                                                                                                 
 
available by the ban in that case gave citizens the ability to defend themselves. See 
993 F. Supp. 2d 188, 194 (N.D.N.Y. 2014).  
 232. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). 
 233. See DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 127 (2d ed. 2011). 
 234. See 17A AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 31 (2004). 
 235. E.g., Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative 
Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 377 (1996).  
 236. See Gregory T. Helding, Stop Hammering Fourth Amendment Rights: 
Reshaping the Community Caretaking Exception with the Physical Intrusion 
Standard, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 123, 133 n.64 (2013) (“Legal scholars and jurists alike 
agree that reasonableness is a malleable standard[.]”) (collecting sources); see also 
D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008) (criticizing Justice Breyer’s dissent for 
proposing “a judge-empowering ‘interest-balancing inquiry . . . .’”). 
 237. See, e.g., Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1572–73 
(2009). 
2015] SECOND AMENDMENT “TYPE OF WEAPON” ANALYSIS 57 
 
force courts to point to available objective evidence to support their 
conclusions. 
In fact, at least one court has successfully evaluated similar 
considerations to those proposed by the reasonable self-defense test 
in a Second Amendment type of weapon case by relying largely on 
objective facts. In Colorado Outfitters Ass’n v. Hickenlooper,238 the 
court heard a challenge to Colorado’s ban on magazines capable of 
holding more than fifteen rounds of ammunition.239 Unlike the other 
cases discussed above, which were either decided at the preliminary 
injunction or summary judgment stage, the court held a bench trial 
where it heard testimony from numerous expert witnesses about the 
self-defense utility of the banned magazines.240 The court also 
considered other evidence bearing on whether the banned magazines 
were an appropriate choice for self-defense, including the likelihood 
of criminal use and whether using the magazines in self-defense 
situations harms innocent bystanders.241   
The Hickenlooper court fit this evidence into the analytical 
framework as part of the second step of the analysis after concluding 
that the weapons were in common use for purposes of the first 
step.242 Nevertheless, the court’s approach is an example of how 
courts could apply a reasonable self-defense test by carefully 
examining evidence presented by the parties about the self-defensive 
potential of the weapons at issue—perhaps in some cases, as in 
Hickenlooper, with a full bench trial. Although weighing competing 
expert testimony and other evidence can be a somewhat subjective 
exercise, a court—like the one in Hickenlooper—will at least be able 
to articulate the objective facts that gave rise to its decision.           
Another objection to this test might be that allowing courts to 
consider the existence of available alternative weapons is 
inconsistent with Heller. Heller did reject the District of Columbia’s 
argument that the availability of long guns should allow the ban on 
handguns to survive.243 However, the Court’s reasons for rejecting 
this argument are instructive. Although the Court again reiterated 
how common handguns were, it also recited several reasons why 
                                                                                                                 
 
 238. 24 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1050–51 (D. Colo. 2014). 
 239. Id. at 1054–56. The court also considered a Second Amendment challenge to 
a law requiring background checks for private transfers of firearms and a vagueness 
challenge to the grandfather clause for non-compliant magazines possessed prior to 
the ban’s enactment. Id. at 1056–58. 
 240. Id. at 1069–72. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. at 1069. The court ultimately concluded that the ban satisfied 
intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 1073–74. 
 243. D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629 (2008). 
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handguns were preferable to long guns for self-defense, including 
ease of use and accessibility in an emergency.244 In other words, the 
available alternative—long guns—was unsatisfactory because the 
banned weapon—the handgun—was a better choice for self-defense 
for the reasons the Court articulated.   
This is exactly the type of inquiry that the reasonable self-
defense test contemplates. It would not be enough for a court simply 
to find that any alternative weapon existed. Rather, courts would 
have to ask whether the banned weapon is a reasonable choice for 
self-defense, given the available alternatives. Such a test would 
necessarily require examining the capabilities and limitations of 
those alternatives alongside the capabilities and limitations of the 
banned weapons, just as the Court did in Heller. 
Finally, it may be objected that this test has no relationship to 
the prefatory clause of the Second Amendment regarding the 
preservation of the militia. The common use test is at least 
purportedly connected to the militia because people in the founding 
era used the arms they had at home when they reported for militia 
duty. However, the idea of connecting the content of the right to the 
purpose stated in the prefatory clause was soundly rejected by 
Heller.245 There is no reason for this one component of the right to 
continue to be chained to the prefatory clause when the rest of the 
right is completely unmoored from it. Instead, the content of the 
“arms” portion of the right should be interpreted just like the rest of 
the Second Amendment—with an eye toward self-defense, the 
Second Amendment’s central purpose.     
CONCLUSION 
In the coming years, the issue of what types of guns and 
accessories are protected by the Second Amendment is going to 
become more and more salient. Whether it comes up in the form of 
clashes over assault weapon bans, the imposition of mandatory 
safety features on firearms, or the introduction of newer forms of 
firearms and non-lethal weapons, the courts will need a framework 
to sort out these claims.   
                                                                                                                 
 
 244. Id. (“There are many reasons that a citizen may prefer a handgun for home 
defense: It is easier to store in a location that is readily accessible in an emergency; it 
cannot easily be redirected or wrestled away by an attacker; it is easier to use for 
those without the upper body strength to lift and aim a long gun; it can be pointed at 
a burglar with one hand while the other hand dials the police.”). 
 245. See id. at 595–99. 
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The common use test fails to provide a framework that is either 
practical or connected to the purpose of the Second Amendment 
right. Engaging in a difficult and likely arbitrary effort to assess the 
popularity of contested weapons will not protect citizens’ ability to 
engage in the armed self-defense Heller envisioned, nor will it 
ensure that the most dangerous and unnecessary weapons are kept 
off of the streets.   
The implementation of a test based on whether a weapon is a 
reasonable choice for lawful, armed self-defense will by no means 
make these cases easy for courts to resolve. The question of whether 
particular weapons would be more useful for self-defense or more 
likely to hurt the innocent has been at the center of a vigorous and 
contentious national debate for decades. But, at least by asking the 
right question, litigants will be able to have an honest battle over 
these issues in the courts, rather than being forced to engage in a 
proxy argument about popularity. 
 
